


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


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**A STUDY OF AIR FORCE THEATER-BASED CONTINGENCY
CONTRACTING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR A
POWER PROJECTION STRATEGY**

THESIS

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Captain, USAF

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AFIT/GCM/LAS/93S-10

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

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**A STUDY OF AIR FORCE THEATER-BASED CONTINGENCY
CONTRACTING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR A POWER
PROJECTION STRATEGY**

THESIS

Presented to Faculty of the School of Logistics and Acquisition Management
of the Air Force Institute of Technology
Air Education and Training Command
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirement for the Degree of
Master of Science in Contracting Management

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September 1993

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Preface

The purpose of this study was to examine how contingency contracting officers (CCOs) that deployed to Operation Desert Shield/Storm felt about the training they received before the operation. Our reasons for examining this topic were not to imply that the job done by CCOs was less than superior. In fact, the performance of those called upon to deploy was exceptional and they deserve countless awards and accolades. We undertook this study to improve Air Force readiness for future contingencies and we hope the results will be used to the end.

We never would have completed this study without the guidance, counsel and support of several individuals. We wish to express our sincere appreciation to our thesis advisors, Lt Col Mike Heberling and Major Bob Pappas, whose wisdom, direction, and discerning eyes were invaluable. We also wish to express our gratitude to SMSgt (CMSgt Select) Mike Davis for his time and assistance throughout this effort and Nina Goldberg for her patient editing. Thanks certainly go to those individuals who participated in the study for their candor and cooperation. We also thank our many friends and classmates for their help, support, and comic relief which made our AFIT stay a rewarding experience.

Finally, we must recognize the two most important pillars of support in our lives during this research period. To our families, Boutia, Chris, Joshua, and Brandon, we are deeply indebted to you for your love, patience,

and understanding during one of the most trying times in our lives. We owe you more than we can put into words. We love you. Thanks!

Tom Snyder

Jon Tigges

Table of Contents

	Page
Preface	ii
List of Figures	vii
List of Tables	ix
Abstract	xi
I. Introduction	1
Chapter Overview	1
Background	2
Problem Statement	3
Investigative Questions	3
Scope and Limitations	5
Definition of Terms	6
Thesis Overview	7
II. Literature Review	8
Chapter Overview	8
Power Projection Strategy	8
Development of the PPS	8
Logistics Challenges of a PPS	10
The Need for Theater-Based Contingency Contracting	11
Theater-Based Contracting Support During ODS	15
Army Contingency Contracting During ODS	16
Air Force Contingency Contracting During ODS	18
CCO Lessons Learned from ODS	20
Need for Research on Theater-Based Contingency Contracting	24
Summary of Literature Review	26
II. Methodology	28
Introduction	28
Research Design	28
Population	31
Sample Selection	32
Instrument Design	33
Pretest	34
Final Survey Instrument	35

	Page
Data Collection	36
Electronic Survey	37
Data Analysis	40
Summary of Methodology	42
IV. Data Analysis and Discussion	44
Introduction	44
Electronic Mail Survey Response	44
Demographics	45
Analysis of Investigative Questions	46
IQ-1	47
IQ-2	48
IQs 3 and 4	49
IQs 5 and 6	49
Base Exercises	50
Deployment Exercises	50
On-the-Job Training (OJT)	51
IQ-7	52
IQ-8	53
IQ-9	54
IQ-10	56
IQ-11	57
IQ-12	59
IQ-13	61
IQ-14	63
Chapter Summary	64
V. Conclusions and Recommendations	65
Introduction	65
Conclusions	65
Formal Courses	66
Base Exercises	67
Deployments	67
On-the-Job (OJT) Training	68
Base Mobility Preparation	68
Post ODS Training Initiatives	69
Contracting Tools	69
Key Areas of Training	69
Commander Awareness	70
Use of Electronic Mail for Data Gathering	70

	Page
Recommendations	71
Create a Formal CCO Course	71
Improve On-the-Job (OJT) Training	71
Use Scenarios to Supplement Training Efforts	71
Increase CCO Involvement in Exercises	72
Review Mobility Assignments	72
Enhance Commander Training	72
Consider the Use of Electronic Mail for Data Collection	73
Study Limitations	73
Suggestions for Further Study	73
Appendix A: Survey Instrument	75
Appendix B: Matrix of Survey Questions Related to IQs	93
Appendix C: Survey Question Statistics	94
Appendix D: Responses to Open-Ended Survey Questions	135
Appendix E: Interviews	199
Bibliography	205
Vitae	208

List of Figures

Figure	Page
C-1. Rank of Respondents at Time of Deployment	94
C-2. Experience of Respondents at Time of Deployment	95
C-3. Gender of Respondents	96
C-4. Number of Months Spent in AOR	97
C-5. Phase of Operation in Which Respondents Participated'	98
C-6. Respondents Association with Wing Commander	99
C-7. Respondents the Held Mobility Position Numbers	100
C-8. Working Location of Respondents	101
C-9. Number of Formal Courses Respondents Attended that Included Contingency Contracting	102
C-10. Number of Base Exercises Respondents Participated in that Practiced Contingency Contracting	103
C-11. Number of Deployment Exercises Respondents Participated in that Practiced Contingency Contracting	104
C-12. Number of Real World Deployments Respondents Participated in Before ODS	105
C-13. Quality of Coverage of Contingency Contracting in Formal Courses	106
C-14. Respondents' Quality of Knowledge of Regulations	107
C-15. Quality of CCO Training from Base OJT	108
C-16. Quality of CCO Training Received from Base Exercises	109
C-17. Quality of CCO Training Received from Deployment Exercises	110
C-18. Preparation Received from Formal Courses	111

Figure	Page
C-19. Respondents' Views on More Formal Course Training	112
C-20. Contingency Contracting as a Separate Course	113
C-21. Worthiness of Additional Formal Course Training	114
C-22. Base Exercise Contribution to Proficiency	115
C-23. Desire for More Base Exercise Training	116
C-24. Base Exercise Preparation for ODS	117
C-25. Deployment Exercise Preparation for ODS	118
C-26. Deployment Exercise Contribution to Proficiency	119
C-27. Desire for More Training from Deployments	120
C-28. OJT Contribution to Proficiency	121
C-29. Desire for More OJT Training Before ODS	122
C-30. OJT Preparation for ODS	123
C-31. Wing Commander Support	124
C-32. Deployed Commander Comprehension	125
C-33. Deployed Commander Increase in Comprehension	126
C-34. Current Logistics Commander Comprehension	127
C-35. Current Wing Commander Comprehension	128

List of Tables

Table	Page
1. Top Ten Significant Training Topics	55
2. Rank of Most Effective Training Method	56
3. Rank of Most Critical Equipment or Tool	58
4. Training Initiatives Implemented Since ODS	60
5. Experiences Suited for Crossfeed	62
6. Future Training Scenarios	63
7. Suggested Improvements for the Future	64
C-1. Responses to Question 1	94
C-2. Responses to Question 2	95
C-3. Responses to Question 3	96
C-4. Responses to Question 4	97
C-5. Responses to Question 5	98
C-6. Responses to Question 6	99
C-7. Responses to Question 7	100
C-8. Responses to Question 8	101
C-9. Responses to Question 9	102
C-10. Responses to Question 10	103
C-11. Responses to Question 11	104
C-12. Responses to Question 12	105
C-13. Responses to Question 13	106
C-14. Responses to Question 14	107

Table	Page
C-15. Responses to Question 15	108
C-16. Responses to Question 16	109
C-17. Responses to Question 17	110
C-18. Responses to Question 18	111
C-19. Responses to Question 19	112
C-20. Responses to Question 20	113
C-21. Responses to Question 21	114
C-22. Responses to Question 22	115
C-23. Responses to Question 23	116
C-24. Responses to Question 24	117
C-25. Responses to Question 25	118
C-26. Responses to Question 26	119
C-27. Responses to Question 27	120
C-28. Responses to Question 28	121
C-29. Responses to Question 29	122
C-30. Responses to Question 30	123
C-31. Responses to Question 31	124
C-32. Responses to Question 32	125
C-33. Responses to Question 33	126
C-34. Responses to Question 34	127
C-35. Responses to Question 35	128
C-36. Rank Order of Training Topics from T-Test	131

Abstract

This research examined the training needs of theater-based contingency contracting officers (CCOs) for a Power Projection Strategy (PPS). CCOs that deployed to support Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS) were asked to provide their perceptions of the training they received before ODS, their perceptions of training and equipment needs as a result of lessons learned from ODS, and determine whether current training meets those needs. The results of the study show that CCOs believe there are many aspects of training that can be improved to ensure that future participants in a PPS do not have to relearn the lessons of ODS.

A STUDY OF AIR FORCE THEATER-BASED CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR A POWER PROJECTION STRATEGY

I. Introduction

You can talk all you want about the air and ground campaigns, and -- God bless them -- those warriors did a magnificent job. I'd never begin to take anything away from them. Ten years from now, however, when historians and strategists and tacticians study the Gulf War -- what they will study most carefully will be the logistics. This was a war of logistics. (Krulak, 1991:57)

Chapter Overview

The Persian Gulf War demonstrated the value of purchasing goods and services in the theater of operation by deployed contingency contracting officers (CCOs). Not only did deployed CCOs drastically reduce the amount of men and materials that needed to be brought into the theater, but they also played a pivotal role in actual combat operations (Pagonis, 1992:146). Since the end of the Gulf War, many changes have been made in the guidance and structure of Air Force contingency contracting. However, the decision-makers making these changes have had limited data to work with in determining their actions. This thesis aims at providing future decision-makers and trainers with a comprehensive analysis of Air Force contingency

contracting training requirements for a scenario similar to that of another Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS).

This paper begins by familiarizing the reader with how the new Power Projection Strategy (PPS) evolved, the importance of logistics in this strategy, the logistics lessons learned regarding the U.S. PPS capabilities in ODS, theater-based contracting's key role in ODS, and why the training and equipping of contingency contracting for a PPS needs further study. This introductory chapter also describes the scope and objectives of this research, defines important terms, and gives the reader an overview of the rest of this thesis.

Background

The end of the Cold War, reduced military budgets, and the resulting withdrawal of U.S. troops from overseas, resulted in a new military strategy that is commonly referred to as *Power Projection* (Karegeannes and Martinous, 1992:18). This strategy dictates that the United States maintain highly mobile forces to deploy overwhelming force quickly and to fight decisively anywhere in the world. The success of this strategy depends greatly on a solid logistics capability. Deployed contingency contracting officers play a significant role in this new strategy.

ODS gave the U.S. military its first test of the PPS. One of the primary logistics lessons of ODS involved the inadequacy of the United States' strategic lift capabilities. Deployed CCOs demonstrated their value by

decreasing the strains on U.S. strategic lift and directly supporting combat operations. Although deployed CCOs performed well, current literature and expert opinions indicate there are many aspects of contingency contracting that can be improved. Specifically, many of the contingency contracting officers who deployed during ODS lacked the training and equipment necessary to be effective in a wartime environment.

Since America's political and military leaders believe that ODS is a representative example of future conflicts, it is important to take a comprehensive look at how the effectiveness of contingency contracting can be improved. Therefore, this paper examines CCO training and equipping for a PPS.

Problem Statement

The purpose of this study is to identify the training needs of contingency contracting officers for a Power Projection Strategy. This will be accomplished by: (1) determining the perceptions of CCOs regarding the training they received prior to ODS, (2) determining the perceptions of CCOs regarding training and equipment needs as a result of ODS, (3) identifying the training initiatives implemented after ODS, and (4) determining if current CCO training and equipping meets identified needs.

Investigative Questions

The following investigative questions will help answer the problem statement:

1. What level of experience did deployed CCOs possess with regard to training received from formal academic courses, base exercises, deployment exercises, and real world deployments? •
2. How did deployed CCOs perceive the quality of the training they received prior to ODS? •
3. Did CCOs feel the training they received from formal academic courses prior to ODS was worthwhile?
4. Do CCOs feel training from formal academic courses is necessary?
5. Did deployed CCOs feel that the training received from base exercises, deployments, and on-the-job (OJT) training prepared them for the requirements of ODS?
6. Do CCOs feel additional training in Base exercises, deployments and OJT would improve their proficiency for operating under a Power Projection Strategy? •
7. Did CCOs feel the deployed wing command structure understood the capabilities and limitations of CCOs and provide support? •

8. Do CCOs feel their current wing command structure understands contingency contracting capabilities and limitations?
9. What topics do CCOs believe need the most emphasis in preparation for a Power Projection Strategy?
10. Which medium of training do CCOs perceive is the most effective?
11. Which tools did CCOs feel were most critical to performing their mission?
12. What are the perceptions of CCOs regarding training initiatives implemented since ODS?
13. What experiences did CCOs encounter that they believe would be beneficial crossfeed information for future training initiatives?
14. What suggestions do CCOs have for improving contingency contracting training?

Scope and Limitations

The focus of this research will deal strictly with Air Force deployed contingency contracting officers who deployed during ODS. As such, it will

not directly cover natural disasters and mishaps, stateside contracting actions to support war-fighting efforts, nor Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). The research will center strictly on the training perceptions of CCOs who deployed during ODS.

Definition of Terms

To help the reader better understand this research, the following definitions are offered:

- 1. Power Projection Strategy (PPS):** The political/military strategy centered on lean, flexible, combat-ready reserves stationed in the United States with the capability to quickly mobilize and deploy to a given theater with sufficient lethality and sustainability to deter, or quickly defeat future threats (Crist, 1990:17).
- 2. Area of Operations (AOR):** The general region where friendly forces are deployed to deter or conduct battle.
- 3. Contingency:** Deployments to overseas theaters in response to a crisis or actual declaration of war (Robinson, 1992:1).
- 4. Theater-Based Contingency Contracting:** The purchase of goods and services and supplies while deployed inside the area of operations.
- 5. Deployment Exercise:** The relocation of forces to a new area of operation for training purposes.
- 6. Base Exercise:** A training simulation of a real-world military scenario.

7. **Formal Academic Training:** This includes in-class training such as Professional Continuing Education (PCE) and introductory technical training courses.

8. **On-the-Job Training (OJT):** Training received by doing specific job-related tasks.

9. **Low Intensity Conflict (LIC):** A confrontation which involves the use of military force that is limited in terms of weapons, tactics, or level of conflict.

10. **Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO):** An officer or enlisted contracting person deployed to an AOR to support a crisis or actual declaration of war.

Thesis Overview

The remainder of this thesis takes an in-depth look at Air Force contingency contracting in a Power Projection Strategy. Chapter Two reviews current literature to help the reader develop a deeper understanding of the importance of deployed contingency contracting officers and demonstrates the need for comprehensive research on theater-based contingency contracting. Chapter Three defines the methodology used in this research, and the results of the research are analyzed in Chapter Four. Finally, Chapter Five presents the conclusions and recommendations to improve preparations for future theater-based contingency contracting actions.

II. Literature Review

Chapter Overview

This literature review summarizes information from a variety of sources on how the Power Projection Strategy (PPS) evolved and is represented in Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS), the key role of deployed contingency contracting officers (CCOs) in ODS, and why it is necessary to take a comprehensive look at the equipping and training of Air Force CCOs under such a scenario.

Power Projection Strategy

As mentioned in the first chapter, the end of the Cold War forced the United States to take a second look at its defense priorities. The many changes occurring overseas combined with an increasing budget deficit, changed the primary defense strategy of the U.S. from Containment to Power Projection. Such a strategy focusses on rapid mobility and sustainment capabilities making logistics the centerpiece of any scenario. Theater-based contingency contracting plays a critical logistics role in making the PPS work.

Development of the PPS. In a speech to the U.S. Senate, Senator Sam Nunn described the catalysts for the Power Projection Strategy:

At no other time in the past forty years have we had the three primary forces for change come together -- the change in our security requirements, the change in technological opportunities, and the change in budget imperatives. (Nunn, 1992:624)

The end of the Cold War forced the United States Department of Defense (DoD) to take a second look at its defense priorities. As Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney noted, "...the threat of a short-warning, global war starting in Europe is now less likely than at any time in the last 45 years" (Cheney, 1991:5). And while the free world claimed victory over communism, many U.S. allies, such as the Philippines and Spain, began to ask that the U.S. reduce or eliminate its forward presence on their soil. While these changes were occurring overseas, the budget deficit began to loom as a bigger and bigger political issue at home. With a reduced Soviet threat and fiscal realities hitting home, the military budget became the target of deep cuts.

Military leaders responded to these new fiscal and political realities by suggesting a new strategy. This strategy would deal with the changing military-political nature of the world while realistically dealing with the cutbacks in acquisition, force structure, and a reduced overseas presence. Just before his retirement in 1989 as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe outlined a new DoD model that emphasized "force projection" as the key element (Christman, 1990:50). The primary aspect of this strategy is the ability to project military power from the U.S.

The ability to mobilize quickly and fight decisively became the essence of the new U.S. military strategy. No longer would it rely heavily on overseas forces trained and in-place to fight World War III. Instead, the U.S. military would move to a highly-mobile posture prepared to get conventional forces

to a crisis region expeditiously, sustain them until the stated political objectives are achieved, and then bring them back home (Crist 1990:17-19).

Logistics Challenges of a PPS. With the focus of this new strategy on quick mobility and sustainment, logistics capabilities became the biggest question mark in the success of such a strategy. As former Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Crist explained in the early part of 1990, "The big questions confronting a power projection strategy are: Can we get there from here, and once 'there', can we sustain ourselves?" (Crist, 1990:22).

Even before this new strategy began to take shape, military professionals were beginning to see the increased significance that logistics would play in modern warfare. As General Walter Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff of the Allied Forces in Europe during World War II, explained:

Any amateur can shove tanks, planes, and infantry around the map; the real business of war is getting gas, ammunition, and spare parts to the people that need them, where they need them...the tail, in the form of logistics will more and more wag the dog...logistics will increasingly become the single greatest impediment to have real combat capability. (Ulsamer, 1983:60)

Lieutenant General John Winthrop Hackett pointed to the crucial role of logistics in his book, The Profession of Arms, when he noted:

The primary function of an armed force is to fight in battle. This is nowadays impossible without a highly complex system of supporting activities, especially logistics. (Head, 1992:17)

Ten years ago at the 1983 Air Force Association National Symposium, Lieutenant General James R. Brickel, Deputy Commander in Chief of the now defunct Readiness Command, expressed doubts whether or not the logistics

community could handle the demands of the rest of the military's increasing reliance on mobility and sustainment:

...[the logistics problems are] always the same: getting the right resources in the right amounts, to the right places, at the right time, keeping in mind that we don't have enough logistics and enough lift. (Ulsamer, 1983:64)

On 2 August 1990, President Bush gave a speech outlining the United States' new Power Projection Strategy. Ironically, this was the same day Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait (Cheney, 1991:3). The resulting full-scale mobility and sustainment efforts would truly test if the U.S. military was capable of implementing this new strategy. More specifically, ODS would show that theater-based contingency contracting is a vital part of this strategy.

The Need for Theater-Based Contingency Contracting

Quick analyses of the situation by military leaders, both in the United States and in Saudi Arabia, led to the conclusion that our limited-and-precious transport space should be reserved for combat troops, and for those supplies, such as weapons and ammunition, that could not be obtained in the theater. Everything else was our problem, to be found and contracted for. (Pagonis, 1992:107)

The deployment to, and eventual conflict in, the Persian Gulf was an excellent place to test the success of implementing the Power Projection Strategy. Limited strategic lift capabilities would emphasize the need for acquiring as many goods and services in the theater of operations as possible. The end result was an appreciation of the importance of CCOs in successfully deploying and sustaining a large-scale combat force.

The PPS presumes that moving a credible force to an area at the outset of a crisis, when stability is threatened, is key to strategic success (Christman, 1990:50). Dedicated airlift and fast sealift efforts indicates that the U.S. military has some formidable capabilities in meeting its quick mobility needs. However, it took the full-time commitment of ninety percent of the C-5 fleet and eighty percent of the C-141 fleet to transport just fifteen percent of the dry cargo moved during this effort. 85% of the dry cargo was moved by sealift. Sealift picked up the burden of moving heavy equipment and material to the Gulf, but for the most part, it was too slow for a Power Projection Strategy. Fast sealift was the exception. These oversized, roll-on/roll-off vessels were able to get heavy weapons and equipment to the Gulf in half the time (two versus four weeks) that it took conventional vessels. These ships were tremendously valuable in a Power Projection Strategy. In fact, when the first two fast sealift ships arrived in Saudi Arabia, they carried more tonnage than the entire airlift up to that point (Johnson, 1991:30).

Other than airlift and fast sealift, moving war supplies by ships was a long and tedious process requiring at least a month or more to complete. Only 12 of the 44 Ready Reserve ships could be activated in the specified 5-day period (McGehee, 1991:5). In fact, many of the ships used to accomplish this function were so old that it was hard to find crews to operate their steam turbines. In one case, an 80-year-old seaman came out of retirement to help (Mitchell, 1991:42).

Although the Power Projection Strategy calls for the ability to move out quickly, Desert Shield clearly showed just how many weaknesses the U.S. military has in this area. As General Gray noted, "Our forces must have the ability to get to areas of crisis quickly and by multiple means of deployment" (Gray, 1991:14). The Gulf War demonstrated that the United States currently does not have enough airlift and fast sealift forces to, as Confederate Army General Nathaniel Bedford said, "get there the firstust with the mostest," unless it has considerable time to build up (Christman, 1992:50).

One of the clearest lessons of the Gulf War is that the United States cannot rely on airlift and fast sealift alone to support the Power Projection Strategy. Even though the U.S. staged the largest airlift of troops and equipment in history, it was still too slow. "If the situation had been slightly different and Iraq had attacked the 82nd Airborne soon after deployment, the light rapid deployment forces would have served as little more than a speed bump for the then-massed Iraqi Army" (Hoffman, 1991:2-3).

Despite their superior numbers and armor, the Iraqi forces chose not to attack. Instead, the United States had six months to build-up and prepare to take the offensive. It is unclear how the U.S. logistics community would have responded if it had to start combat operations in August instead of six months later. General Schwarzkopf noted later that in the event of an attack, the only option U.S. forces would have had was to "...pull back to an enclave on the coast and hope we could either reinforce them or get them out" (Schwarzkopf, 1992: 310).

The comprehensive mobilization, build-up, and sustainment of ODS showed that the United States military has tremendous capabilities -- once it gets them in place. However, it lacks the strategic lift resources to mobilize at the speed that a Power Projection Strategy dictates. It is also unlikely the DoD will get considerably more strategic lift resources to make up for this shortfall. So the question becomes what can be done to reduce our reliance on strategic lift resources.

Various sources chronicled three major ways that reduced the strain on the over-burdened lift system. Pre-positioned supplies, highly accurate and reliable weapon systems, and contracts let within the theater all took some strain off strategic airlift and fast sealift.

Pre-positioned supplies not only saved airlift missions, but were also a fast way to support our deployed personnel. Smart planning allowed much of the initial armor, equipment, and support to come from pre-positioned supplies in and around Saudi Arabia. These in-place assets saved the equivalent of 1800 airlift missions. Altogether, prepositioned supplies and equipment provided the infrastructure to build 21 airfields (Suit, 1991:13).

As many experts noted before and after the war, "Technology is a force multiplier" (McGehee 1991:10). From a logistical viewpoint, the success of precision weapon systems translated into a reduced need in the number of people and weapons it took to complete a mission. For example, only 7,400 of the 67,000 tons of munitions used during the war were "smart bombs," yet these weapons took an "enormous and disproportionate toll on hard-to-

destroy Iraqi targets" (Suit, 1991:15). Increasing the accuracy of a weapon reduces the number of weapons systems needed to destroy a target. This fact, in turn, reduces the logistics tail necessary to support a successful operation.

Technology also transformed itself into reliability, as well. High-tech systems were as reliable as they were lethal, achieving better than peacetime mission capable rates in many cases (Hagel, 1992: 6-7). As one author noted, "A point came at which more sophisticated weapons were also inherently more reliable and even easier to use" (Owen, 1992:52). Like accuracy, reliability translates into a reduced logistics tail. A reduced logistics tail translates into a reduction in the need for airlift and fast sealift assets.

Pre-positioned materials quickly brought needed resources into the theater and high-tech weapons cut down on the manpower and material needed to accomplish stated objectives. However, the job of finding and buying needed resources in the theater of operations was left to deployed CCOs. The age-old practice of an army living off the land continued with the help of deployed contingency contracting officers. CCOs emerged as a "key element" in the success of the operation (Pagonis and Raugh, 1991:31). Some of the actions and stories of deployed CCOs will be outlined in the next few paragraphs.

Theater-Based Contracting Support During ODS

*...contracted support was the key to our survival in the desert.
(Pagonis, 1992:108)*

From the first days of the deployment, contracting officers set up agreements for food, water, lodging, laundry, sanitary disposal, communications, construction, vehicles, and equipment (Pagonis, 1992: 107-108). Not only did theater-based contracts permit airlift and fast sealift assets to focus on hauling critical combat-related items, but, in many cases, they were also a faster and more efficient way of providing necessities (Griswold, 1991:79). For instance, the primary means of transporting troops -- one of the most critical issues in the theater -- was by contracted busses (Langenus, 1991:43). In fact, 2,500 of the 3,900 vehicles used to haul supplies and personnel during General Schwarzkopf's famous *Hail Mary* flanking maneuver to western Iraq, were contracted busses and trucks driven by contracted multinationals (Pagonis and Krause, 1992:8). As General Schwarzkopf noted, "I think guys like me need to be reminded every now and then that trucks can be as important as tanks" (Mitchell, 1991:42).

Army and Air Force contingency contracting efforts have been documented in a variety of sources. To help the reader gain an appreciation for the dynamics of theater-based contracting during ODS, this paper presents an overview of the Army and Air Force contingency contracting efforts.

Army Contingency Contracting During ODS. The night before he deployed to Riyadh, General Gus Pagonis, the commander responsible for all the logistics support for the deployed Army forces, recalled his concern that contracting would be the "key sustainment issue" (Pagonis, 1992:73). As a

result, Army contracting officers deployed with the first units arriving in the theater (Byther, 1991:23). Many CCOs began their stay with "nowhere to live, no office space to work out of, and plenty of work to do" (Hyde, 1991:28). To help the limited number of CCOs accomplish their massive task, the Army made extensive use of unit ordering officers to purchase small-dollar items (less than \$2,500) that units needed immediately (Byther, 1991:23).

The early arrangements for host-nation support were "spontaneous reactions to immediate needs" because there was simply not enough time to follow normal contracting procedures (Pagonis, 1992:105).

Because of the urgency to obtain goods and services, we often write a solicitation and put it on the street for 3 days. Then we open bids, determine the competitive range, conduct negotiations, and award the contract--all in a 2-day period. That is a total of 5 days to complete the acquisition process! (Byther, 1991:24)

Over time, as the crisis diminished and our logistical resources grew, we came into conformance with the doctrinal guidelines governing bidding and purchasing. But it took time and a great level of effort to reach that level of organization. (Pagonis, 1992:105)

The first two months were spent leasing equipment and buying goods and services. Army CCOs recall being frustrated by the large amount of "incomplete, nonspecific, poorly written" purchase requests (Byther, 1991:24). Regardless of their frustrations, Army CCOs managed to buy or negotiate a multitude of items.

We leased means of transportation (large trucks, buses, flatbed trailers, four-wheel-drive vehicles, sedans), refrigerated vans, water tankers, construction equipment (bulldozers, bucket loaders, graders, dump trucks, rollers), forklifts, computers, and

photocopiers. We purchased water, tents, lumber, burlap cloth, latrines, shaving stands, tables, fire extinguishers, food preparation equipment, recreation equipment, minor construction, ice beds, lights, generators, cement barricades, newspapers, chairs, air conditioners, office supplies, cleaning supplies, and repair parts. We negotiated contracts for laundry, waste and trash removal, and catering services. (Byther, 1991:24)

In fact, by late December, U.S. CCOs had rented every car, truck, and bus that was rentable in Saudi Arabia, and still didn't have enough transportation to meet all the requirements (Pagonis, 1992:105).

Despite the urgency involved in the contracting effort, there are some good examples of cost savings efforts. For instance, one contract bought fresh and freshly cooked meals from Saudi contractors for \$1.95 instead of the \$4.00 for the Army's MREs. This contract not only saved American taxpayers' dollars, but also improved the quality of life for soldiers (Pagonis, 1992:115).

Air Force Contingency Contracting During ODS. The Air Force contingency contracting effort did not get as much published notoriety as the Army effort. However, the literature available detailing the Air Force efforts in theater-based contingency contracting parallels the Army in many respects. Like the Army, a small contingent of Air Force CCOs from Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) were among the first to arrive in the AOR. The first Air Force CCO contingent landed at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on 7 August 1991 -- just seven days after the invasion of Kuwait (Griswold, 1991:78).

Because CENTAF CCOs were unable to go in to do site surveys or market surveys before the invasion of Kuwait, they arrived with "no idea who to buy from or what was available, so we basically had to start from

scratch" (Griswold, 1991:78). After some initial confusion, teams of contracting officers would go out to help bed-down new arriving units -- many at nothing more than "just a patch of runway and some sand and maybe a source of water." Sometimes a force of twelve to fifteen CCOs were bedding down up to seven units at one time (Griswold, 1991:79).

Responsiveness outweighed quality and price in the first days of the deployment as CCOs concentrated on contracting for quarters, transportation, material handling equipment, food service, potable water, and ground fuels (HQ USCENTAF, 1991:1). In the early days of the war, the Air Force found it was "faster and more efficient" to buy necessities off the local economy than to bring in the kitchens, tents, and other items on prepositioned barges (Griswold, 1991:79). One article described the Air Force support as follows:

During the early phases of the deployment, while asset flow problems and backlogs were still being worked out, local purchase saved the day. When asset shortfalls were identified, local purchase was accomplished where possible. Contracting support was superb and greatly enhanced mission support. (Daly, 1991:5)

The lack of automation tools also caused problems. Manual forms and an inadequate contract tracking system created an administrative nightmare as the deployment continued. The Air Force Logistics Management Center responded later by creating the Deployable Contract Automated Tracking System that could be installed on laptop computers (Griswold, 1991:79).

Another problem theater-based CCOs had to overcome was the transportation of goods only available from the United States. They overcame this by using

the *Desert Express* airlift that flew daily out of Charleston AFB, South Carolina to ferry over medical equipment, vehicle parts, communication equipment, electrical items, and other items difficult to find in the AOR (HQ USCENTAF, 1991:3).

In recognition of the outstanding performance of Air Force CCOs, the CENTAF Directorate of Contracting received the 1991 Thomas P. Gerrity Award -- the Air Force Association's highest honor in logistics (Griswold, 1991:78).

CCO Lessons Learned from ODS

...learning is never over, no problem is solved forever, and good answers may be found in unlikely places. (Pagonis, 1992:194)

Although contingency contracting officers did an outstanding job during ODS, some veterans have expressed that there are some aspects of contingency contracting that need to be improved (HQ USCENTAF, 1991:2-5). Like many areas of logistics, some contingency contracting officers were not trained and ready to support a wartime environment. If it wasn't for quality people and several months to work out problems, our Desert Storm logistics efforts may have been inadequate to support our operational forces (Bird, 1992:20). Numerous sources pointed out that realistic training for logistics troops in the mud and friction of realistic exercises is critical for developing the resourcefulness, tenacity, and perseverance necessary for wartime success (Beauchamp, 1992:12-13). Colonel Bruce Block noted after the war:

Operational planners and logisticians must be aware of the increased burden that logistics units will be expected to carry... Only by peacetime preparation for the difficult task of mobilization can we expect to perform well when called upon. (Block, 1992:23)

One of the main reasons the Army logistics effort went as well as it did was because of advance preparation. General Gus Pagonis in his book, Moving Mountains, gives a detailed account of the entire Army logistics saga. One of the biggest aspects of his story is the theater-based contracting support necessary to deploy, sustain, and employ a combat force. He spends a great deal of time emphasizing contingency planning in all his logistics efforts. As he notes:

Logisticians deal with unknowns. They attempt to eliminate unknowns, one by one, until they are confident that they have done away with the possibility of paralyzing surprises. (Pagonis, 1992:2)

To facilitate pro-active thinking, Pagonis used a full-time contingency planning staff throughout ODS to analyze existing plans and come up with contingency plans for them. Pagonis also made his Support Command people step through scenarios and potential challenges in a classroom setting. He wanted to do "Monday-morning quarterbacking on Saturday afternoon-- in other words, to use hindsight ahead of time" (Pagonis, 1992:102-104). One of the results of this type of proactive mind-set was that during the entire conflict, not a single Army mission was canceled, postponed, curtailed, or even delayed for lack of logistical support (Pagonis, 1992:150).

Even good contingency planning, however, could not anticipate all problems in advance. Cultural issues, for instance, created problems that CCOs had to overcome as they went. For example, the most challenging aspect of conducting business in Middle East was the Arab's amazingly casual approach to time (Pagonis, 1992:111). Or, as Capt Jake Arellano put it: "In the Army, now means now. In Saudi Arabia, now means 'when I get a chance'" (Hyde, 1991:29). Saudi businesses were also used to being paid in advance, not by submitting an invoice (Byther, 1991:23).

Another unplanned event happened in early November 1989 when the government of Saudi Arabia agreed to pay for all fuel, transportation, water, food, and facilities. This benefit for taxpayers turned into a quandary for CCOs as they had to transform contracts written according to American regulations into Saudi contracts. This process created "all kinds of problems with payments, invoices, and the renegotiation of prices" (Griswold, 1991:79). Similar cultural frustrations emerged as CCOs tried to write lengthy contracts with businessmen used to oral agreements (Almas and others, 1992:24).

Fortunately, The Army and Air Force had six months to work through the various contracting dilemmas they were unprepared for when they arrived in the theater. Although it is uncertain how the U.S. military would have responded with less time to prepare, one issue is very clear -- most authors note that it cannot plan for such a permissive environment in the future. After the war, Secretary Cheney came to the same conclusion:

...[Desert Storm] presages very much the type of conflict we are most likely to confront again in this new era -- major regional contingencies against foes well-armed with advanced conventional and nonconventional weaponry...We must configure our policies and forces to effectively deter, or quickly defeat, such future threats. (Cheney, 1991:6)

After the war, many after action reports were written summarizing lessons learned and pushing for changes in the way the contracting community conducts itself in wartime. The Air Staff, major commands, and individual units required their people to write down lessons learned in one format or another. Many of these were recorded in the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS). The JULLS lessons learned were screened by a team of Air Force Logistics Management Center personnel who noted that "very few lessons were received discussing contracting efforts; however, we understand many of the lessons and concerns of Air Force contracting officers and NCOs were collected by CENTAF." Ten lessons learned packages were provided to CENTAF by deployed CCO teams giving insights primarily into various individual situations. As a result of these reports and the experiences of CCOs who returned to staff positions, training guides were updated or new ones added. The regulation governing contingency contracting, AFR 70-7, the Contingency Operational Contracting Support Program, was rewritten and expanded. Also, specialized booklets were developed by USCENTAF to help CCOs deploying to Southwest Asia. The Air Force Logistics Management Center (AFLMC) has taken the lead role in coordinating the publishing of these products.

Before ODS, the primary guide was the Wartime Contingency Contracting Handbook (Busch, 1986). Since ODS, AFLMC created the Wartime Contingency Contracting Handbook Update (Robinson, 1992a), Statements of Work (SOW) for Contingency Contracting (Robinson, 1992b), and created the USCENTAF Operational Contracting Guide (Hall & Hauf, 1992) in conjunction with CENTAF. This latter document lays out specific CCO items of interest for working in Southwest Asia and helpful information on the major countries in the region. AFLMC also created several software products; DCATS, mentioned earlier, and the Vendor Source System.

Need for Research on Theater-Based Contingency Contracting

The initial phase of U.S. troop deployment to Saudi Arabia in operation Desert Shield has underscored the necessity for realistic training in extreme operating conditions... (Desert Shield Deployment Shows Need for Realistic Training in Harsh Conditions, 1990:50)

Even before ODS, past researchers have noted that contingency contracting training lacks the realism necessary for success in the field and recommended that improved methods of CCO training be examined (Mason, 1988:14,16). Killen and Wilson, in their thesis research, note that "Few contracting professionals receive specific training to prepare them for military contingencies." As a result, they recommend that additional training courses be developed for contingency contracting (Killen and Wilson, 1992:106,111). The chief of CENTAF contracting efforts, Lt Col Bradley Busch, noted that even those who were trained, were not trained to respond to a PPS like ODS.

He explained after the war that the way CCOs trained in peacetime deployments and the reality of ODS were "inside out." In a peacetime exercise, the contracting team arrives on the scene perhaps two weeks in advance, securing contracts for basic necessities. By the time combat units arrive, everything they will need is already in place. In ODS it was just the reverse with flying units arriving before their support (Griswold, 1991:79).

Since ODS, some significant changes have taken place in the creation of training aids for CCOs and more changes are in progress. However, the information guiding these decisions appears to be based on personal experience or a limited number of after action reports. The question of what is the best way to train and equip CCOs has yet to be answered by a comprehensive review and analysis of the opinions of those who should know best -- those who deployed and supported ODS from within the theater.

In addition to lack of a comprehensive gathering of deployed CCO perceptions, the review of literature revealed a disparity in the amount of formal documentation of the Air Force's contingency contracting efforts during ODS. The Army has recorded their accomplishments and lessons learned in several books, articles, and professional journals. The Air Force lacked a General Pagonis figure to bring logistics, and specifically CCO efforts, to the attention of mainstream America. However, the CCO actions unique to the Air Force need to be recorded and published in an organized fashion for future reference. The window of opportunity to accomplish this task has

almost expired as the third anniversary of Operation Desert Shield approaches.

Overall, the review of the literature on the PPS, logistics and specifically, the theater-based contracting that took place during ODS, reveals that despite some heroic efforts, there are many lessons that can be learned. These lessons, once collected, may be valuable in guiding preparations in training and equipping our contracting personnel for future power projection deployments. General Pagonis notes "...in most future conflicts, the first job of the logistician will be to 'capture' the host-nation infrastructure" (Pagonis, 1992:207-208). To accomplish this task will take a well-trained and equipped CCO corps. To meet these needs, this research effort provides a comprehensive study of deployed CCO training and equipping issues.

Summary of Literature Review

The task faced by logisticians can only be described as daunting, and their success can only be described as spectacular. (Pagonis and Krause, 1992:2)

General Schwarzkopf's statement above indicates the level of success the logistics community achieved in ODS. Despite this success, there are many lessons that one can learn from the Gulf War. To prepare for the future threats that would call on the use of the Power Projection Strategy, the United States military must take a closer look at the key areas that contributed to ODS success and look for ways to improve them. Current literature indicates that one of those key areas is the effectiveness of contingency contracting efforts. However, little has been formally chronicled on the

efforts of deployed Air Force CCOs. Still, a number of new Air Force training initiatives were begun after the war and a number of efforts are still under way. Overall, no comprehensive effort has been made to examine whether or not current CCO training and equipping efforts are adequate to support a PPS scenario. Therefore, that is the focus of this thesis. The next chapter explains the methodology used in this research.

III. Methodology

Introduction

Chapter One identified the focus of this research, and Chapter Two presented a review of the literature regarding the importance of training to the contingency contracting community. This chapter describes the methods used by the researchers to study the opinions of contingency contracting officers (CCOs) deployed during Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS) regarding the adequacy of CCO training. A description and the rationale for the research design is offered, as well as a definition of the population of interest and sample selection. Additionally, the development of the research instrument is reviewed, its testing explained, and an outline of the final product is provided. Also, the data collection plan is discussed, including the unique medium used to gather the data in this study. Finally, the planned analysis of the quantitative data using statistical tests is discussed, and the qualitative data received is evaluated for convergence or divergence of responses.

Research Design

The research used in this study was a hybrid, two-stage design making use of both exploratory and formal research techniques. This method was selected based on the problem as previously stated. From a research perspective, it was determined that the most appropriate method to obtain

data on training of CCOs was through an *ex post facto* design using an interrogative survey conducted by *electronic mail*. The study was *ex post facto* because the responses gathered were strictly for reporting purposes. The researchers had no control over or manipulation of variables.

Due to the nature of this topic and the lack of previous research on this subject, the hybrid design mentioned above emerged as most effective. The interrogative survey (Appendix A) was used to capture the opinions of CCOs who actually deployed to the AOR. It assessed the adequacy of training received before ODS and the areas they felt needed improvement. A telephone survey was conducted with organizations responsible for conducting training in formal academic courses to determine if the curriculums contained contingency contracting material. Additionally, interviews were conducted with the heads of contingency contracting planning and training for Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command. These interviews were conducted to explore the concerns, issues, and initiatives of the operational commands regarding CCO training, as well as gather inputs for particular topics or areas on which to focus this research effort.

The consultations and interviews with command personnel classified this as a two-stage research design. A two-stage design consists of an exploratory phase, where the focus of the research is defined, and a formal phase, where the research focus is investigated. This type of research design is

an efficient method of selecting pertinent areas of study as well as intensely evaluating these factors (Emory and Cooper, 1991:148).

Exploratory research was necessary in order to formulate the investigative questions and develop the formal research instrument (Emory and Cooper, 1991:144). The two stage approach to research design assisted in the crystallization of the research problem. The first phase (exploratory) of a two-stage design is conducting a preliminary study of limited scope. The formal stage of the design begins at the point where the exploratory research ends and the investigative questions are crystallized (Emory and Cooper, 1991:147-148). The second phase of this research effort is considered formal based on the degree of structure and immediate objective. The problem was clearly identified and the objective was to apply precise procedures and data source specifications to answer the investigative questions posed in Chapter One.

The formal stage of the research can best be described as "descriptive." Descriptive research focusses on the who, what, when, and how of the problem rather than the cause (Emory and Cooper, 1991:141). The time dimension of this study was cross-sectional. It was conducted once and represented a snapshot of CCO's perceptions regarding training at one point in time. Additionally, this study was done as a statistical study rather than a case study. Statistical studies are designed for breadth rather than depth and attempt to capture adequately the characteristics of a population by making inferences from a sample of items. Generalizations about findings are

presented based on the representativeness of the sample and validity characteristics of the design.

Population

The population of interest for a research effort includes all entities which meet the parameters of interest defined for the study (Emory and Cooper, 1991:246). The purpose of this study was to obtain the perceptions and opinions of Air Force CCOs that deployed to Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS) with regard to contingency contracting training. In order for the study to be credible, the respondents must be considered *experts*. To meet this criteria, the qualified respondents had to be experienced in operational contracting and have participated in theater-based contingency contracting during ODS. A contracting officer in the Air Force may be an officer, civilian, or enlisted. Therefore, the population is defined as all CCOs that performed theater-based contingency contracting functions in support of ODS. The identification of the population was established through contact with the Headquarters USCENAF contracting staff (LGC) at Shaw, AFB.

CENAF/LGC was the headquarters element for all theater-based contingency contracting conducted by the Air Force during ODS. As such, they were able to supply data on the number of deployed individuals who acted as CCOs in this effort as well as names and points of contact for most. The number of deployed CCOs during ODS provided by CENAF numbered approximately 140. The majority of information was available through a

theater telephone list circulated by CENTAF/LGC to all the field locations during ODS. The relatively small size of the population allowed the researchers to consider the plausibility of taking a census. It was decided that if all personnel could be identified and located, a census would be used. Upon examination of the accessibility of some members of the population it was decided that a sample would be necessary to conduct the study.

Sample Selection

The sampling plan was a combination of the nonprobability methods of convenience sampling and *snowballing*. Convenience samples are unrestricted non-probability samples, which are among the cheapest and easiest to conduct (Emory and Cooper, 1991:274). The phone list collected from CENTAF/LGC was used as a sampling frame and an attempt was made to locate and contact as many individuals on that list as possible. Thus, the personnel contacted were the easiest or most convenient to contact.

Additionally, the *snowballing* method was used in conjunction with the phone list. *Snowballing* is used in situations where respondents are difficult to identify and are best located through referral networks. In the initial stage, individuals are discovered and may, or may not, be selected through probability methods. This group is then used to locate others, who, in turn, identify others. The *snowball* gathers as it rolls along (Emory and Cooper, 277). Using this technique, generic electronic mail messages were sent to all identifiable operational contracting offices asking them to identify

personnel in their office who deployed to ODS. Each office responded by identifying personnel currently at their locations. However, locations also identified personnel that had deployed from their office but were no longer working in their office. Offices also identified personnel they happened to know that deployed from other locations. This method proved extremely successful as 42 of the 136 CCOs in the population were referred through *snowballing*.

Instrument Design

The investigative questions previously stated were answered primarily through the use of a questionnaire, with two exceptions. First, to answer the question regarding contingency contracting coverage in formal academic courses, an informal telephone survey was conducted with those organizations that teach Professional Continuing Education (PCE), and introductory technical training courses. The objective of this survey was to determine whether the PCE or technical training courses have ever, or currently include contingency contracting and to what extent.

The second exception, the investigative question regarding implementation of initiatives since ODS, was answered through a review of literature and interviews with personnel responsible for contingency contracting at the major operational commands. The remaining questions were answered by an electronic mail survey. The survey content focussed on opinions and attitudes of the respondents regarding training of CCOs. The

survey questions were derived from the investigative questions. The information gained from the exploratory research interviews with operational command personnel helped refine the investigative and survey questions. Each survey questions was written so that the respondent could formulate a clear and concise answer. Questions were carefully worded to provide for uniform understanding, as well as to minimize vagueness, bias, and unclear abbreviations or definitions.

Once the survey questions were developed, they were added together to form the complete package. Instructions and an introduction were written, and the questions grouped for appropriate responses. As much as possible, questions followed the funneling technique. The questionnaire package was evaluated as a whole by use of a pretest. Factors considered were size, complexity, and question order (Emory and Cooper, 1991:370). The draft was then reviewed for errors and omissions.

Pretest

To check content validity, a pretest of the instrument was conducted before sending it to the respondents. Contracting personnel currently enrolled in AFIT's Contracting Management Master's Program reviewed it to ensure the survey measured what was intended. Additionally, the electronic mail delivery system was tested using contracting personnel in operational offices in the field. These personnel provided survey content feedback regarding the content of the survey, as well as the time required to respond,

the clarity of the instructions about how to respond, the appearance of the survey on a computer screen, and the timeliness of transmission of the package to the field and back to AFIT. The feedback from this test was tremendously helpful as it prompted an alteration of the format so the response scale could be seen on the screen at all times. Based on information received, the average time to complete the survey was approximately fifteen minutes.

Final Survey Instrument

The final survey was divided into four different response areas. Section I questions were designed to capture objective facts (demographic data). Eight questions were used to identify differences among respondents. Section II contained twenty-six scaled opinion questions and past training perceptions and experiences, and the relevance of these issues to improved performance. This section contained two five point Likert type scales that respondents used to answer questions. Section III used a single five point Likert type scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Questions were designed to capture additional subjective feelings, and attitudes regarding the importance of specific issues to future training efforts. Finally, Section IV made use of open-ended questions to gather qualitative data from the CCOs regarding training and topics of interest to them. This section was designed to provide insight from the CCO perspective about unique situations and experiences encountered during ODS that could not be covered

in other parts of the survey or were unique to individuals. Section IV also provided data outside the scope of this study. Some questions were added to provide data to Air Combat Command to enhance their ability to complete some current initiatives.

Data Collection

A survey was determined to be the most appropriate method for obtaining the data required for this research effort. The geographic location of personnel at bases around the world made personal interviews impractical. A written survey provides consistency of questioning and understanding. It is also more impersonal, providing respondents more freedom to express their views openly. (Emory and Cooper, 1991:333)

The surveys used in the data collection effort were distributed and received through a new and unique medium. Instead of using regular mail, a decision was made to attempt the collection via *electronic mail* (e-mail). All Air Force Operational Contracting Offices use a computer system called the Base Contracting Automated System (BCAS). It primarily uses Wang hardware and software. This system utilizes word processing and interoffice mail functions that can be distributed through a world-wide DoD network to all base contracting offices.

The survey was written using the word processing program on a terminal at the AFIT Civil Engineering complex. The survey was then transmitted electronically as a mail package to all identified personnel

currently located at operational contracting activities. This medium had five distinct advantages over regular mail. First, individuals could be contacted directly, and if no response was received, follow up reminders could be sent immediately and directly. Second, the e-mail system allows status tracking of mail to confirm the respondent received the survey, and to determine if it was read by them. This was used to determine if follow ups were necessary. Third, the time for transmittal and response is usually decreased through e-mail as opposed to postal mail. Fourth, if a respondent had moved to another location the package could be retransmitted instantly, saving time. This was particularly important because specific personnel were being targeted. Due to the high mobility of personnel in the military, it was important to be able to quickly follow the individuals if they had moved. The surveys could not be answered by proxy. Finally, if targeted individuals were no longer in the Air Force (retired/separated), the office would respond to and provide that information via e-mail. This feedback is rarely obtained using regular mail surveys.

Electronic Survey

In order to gather and analyze the data, some special adjustments were made to the instrument. The survey (Appendix A) was constructed so that questions appeared on the left side of the page and all response blocks were provided at the extreme right, across from each question so that responses could be downloaded as an ASCII file onto a disk from the Wang mainframe

system. Then the raw data could be separated from the document as a whole, reformatted and then analyzed on a personal computer.

All text and data were imported into Borland's Quattro Pro spreadsheet program. The raw data was separated from the text using the *Parse* command. This left all data in a single column string separate from all extraneous text. The extraneous text was deleted and the raw data copied and moved into columns corresponding to each respondent's data. Since statistical analysis cannot be accomplished on alphabetic characters, the demographic data responses were transformed into numbers.

Although the e-mail method was successful, it did have drawbacks. First, the Wang system has a 397 line limitation on e-mail messages. Therefore, the survey had to be sent as three separate messages. The first message contained the introduction and instructions. The second message contained the statistical data questions. The third message contained the open-ended qualitative questions.

For the purpose of data analysis, sending the survey in three parts actually proved to be advantageous. The instructions of the first message, when returned, were deleted as unnecessary. The quantitative data portions were in the second message were downloaded and processed as a group. The qualitative questions in message three were also downloaded as a group for reformatting and analysis.

A second limitation of using the e-mail system was direct access to targeted individuals. Due to space constraints of the worldwide directory of

personnel in e-mail, not all users are listed. Those persons whose names appeared in the worldwide directory were sent surveys directly. The remaining individuals were accessed indirectly through a person listed in the directory at that individual's last known location. These e-mail packages were accompanied by a separate note requesting that the mail be forwarded to the specific individual in the office. The inability to access all individuals directly affected the response rate, as reported later.

A third problem, or limitation, was that some bases had trouble sending the surveys back. When they tried the "edit" command to respond to the survey, they received an error message. Attempts to assist them from AFIT also failed, and the respondents ended up printing the survey at their location, answering it manually, and mailing the surveys back. This occurred with six respondents and the data was hand entered into the spreadsheet.

The fourth and final limitation, was that associated with all computer systems, the possibility of system malfunction. The third round responses were significantly lower than usual because of an AFIT system crash which deleted ten days of e-mail traffic in the system. At least three, and possibly more, responses were lost but it was impossible to confirm the number or point of origin of these responses. This same risk was associated with all field offices. If a base system went down it is possible the respondents never read the mail package, even though the status indicates the message was delivered. Despite these limitations, e-mail was a far better method of data collection for this study than regular mail. The scale of follow-ups and retransmittals of

this study could never have been performed in a timely or cost-effective manner using the regular mail method.

The results of the data collection effort were promising. E-mail responses confirmed that fifty-four of the 136 personnel in the population were unaccessible for a variety of reasons including separations, retirements, or transfers to unknown locations. The survey was sent to all the remaining eighty two persons that were accessible by e-mail. Eleven received copies in more than one round as indicated by number of surveys sent. Round one sent thirty four surveys, round two sent twenty, and round three sent thirty nine.

The most significant statistic to note is that eighty-three percent of persons contacted directly returned their survey responses. Only forty-one percent of the individuals that had their package forwarded through someone else in their office responded to the survey. Further results will be discussed in Chapter Four.

Data Analysis

Analysis of data was conducted through descriptive and analytical statistical measures using software hosted on a microcomputer. Borland's Quattro Pro and Analytical Software's Statistix version 3.5 were used to conduct all analyses. The raw data was saved in Quattro Pro as explained in the previous section. This same data was also imported into Statistix for some of the analyses.

Various statistical measures were used to answer the investigative questions (Appendix C). Demographic results were arrived at using simple means, standard deviations, and median calculations to report the percentages of respondents in each category.

The opinion questions, 9-35, were also answered by descriptive statistics. Measures of central tendency and dispersion were indicated by the mean and standard deviation. Frequency distributions using bar charts were conducted to display a graphical picture of respondents' answers.

Measurement questions, 36-120, dealt with the importance of specific topics in future training efforts. To determine the items CCOs felt were most significant for training, a student's T-Test was conducted. The mean response of each question was compared to the value of 4 on the Likert type scale. This comparison tested whether or not the mean rating of each topic actually exceeded the value of 4 at the 99% confidence level. The scale value of 4 and the 99% confidence level were selected in order to provide conservative (in terms of error probability) but highly significant results. The T-stat used the following hypothesis:

H_0 The individual question mean was less than or equal to 4. $\mu_1 \leq 4$

H_a The individual question mean was greater than 4. $\mu_1 > 4$

TEST STATISTIC

$$Z = \frac{\bar{x} - 4}{\frac{s}{\sqrt{n}}}$$

The questions that rejected the null hypothesis were considered by the respondents to be significant topics for training future CCOs.

Questions 121-128 asked respondents to rank order the best method to conduct training and to identify the most critical tools needed to conduct contingency contracting. The questions were answered using the mean and standard deviation calculations.

Finally, questions 129-134 contained qualitative responses and were evaluated for consensus, convergence, and divergence of the responses. After completing these analyses, the investigative questions were answered based on the results as reported in Chapter Four.

Summary of Methodology

This chapter described the methodology used in collecting and analyzing the data required to determine the answers to the investigative questions which, ultimately, fulfill the research objective. The research was separated into two phases, exploratory and formal. The exploratory phase helped guide and define the focus of the research effort. The methodology for the formal phase was specifically outlined in this chapter. An *ex post facto* design was selected that used a survey to gain CCOs opinions about training. The population of interest was all CCOs that deployed to Operation Desert Shield/Storm and performed *in-theater* contingency contracting. A survey was created and pre-tested, then sent via e-mail to the targeted individuals. The data was analyzed using descriptive and/or inferential statistics for

questions 1-128, and qualitative analysis was performed on the open-ended questions. The results of the data analysis are presented in Chapter Four, Data Analysis and Discussion. Recommendations, findings, and conclusions based on the results of these analyses are discussed in Chapter Five.

IV. Data Analysis and Discussion

Introduction

This chapter provides the results of the research. Discussion is divided into four sections: electronic mail survey responses, demographics, answers to the investigative questions (IQs), and summary. Answers to the IQs are addressed through summary statistics, t-tests, and qualitative analysis. In this chapter, percentages are rounded and may not sum to 100 percent. Some respondents did not answer every survey item. Percentages are based on the total number of respondents to the particular survey item.

Electronic Mail Survey Response

The population of interest consisted of 136 individuals identified as contingency contracting officers (CCOs) that deployed during Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS). Attempts to locate the 136 individuals revealed that 54 of them were not available. This meant they were retired, separated, enroute to a new location, at a location not accessible by electronic mail, misidentified, or not found. As a result, 82 persons were left to sample.

Not all CCOs identified in the sample were directly accessible. To reach as many CCOs as possible, the same survey was mailed in three different rounds. Each round targeted a specific type of respondent. In total, 93 survey packages were sent to 82 people (11 people received follow-up messages in

subsequent rounds encouraging them to respond). In all, 47 responses were received for a 57 percent total response rate. Five returned surveys were excluded because the respondents participated only in Operation Provide Comfort. Provide Comfort data, although relevant to contingency contracting, did not meet the parameters set forth for this particular study.

Demographics

The demographics portion of the survey consisted of eight questions: rank, contracting experience, gender, number of months spent in the area of operations (AOR), stage of participation in the operation, relationship to deployed wing commander, mobility position number designee, and working location during the deployment. Demographic data appears in Appendix C.

Demographic analysis revealed that 85% of the deployed CCOs were enlisted personnel, and 15% were officers. Respondents tended to be well experienced in the contracting field. The majority (54%) of respondents indicated they had more than seven years of contracting experience, with 33% of them indicating more than 10 years. Most (95%) respondents were male. The average time spent in the AOR for the respondents was 6 months, with 82% serving between 3 and 8 months. Eighty-six percent of respondents spent time in the AOR during the build up of Operation Desert Shield. As such, they experienced the problems of the initial stages of contingency contracting for a Power Projection scenario that this study targeted.

Only 33% of the respondents indicated that their AOR wing commander was from their home station. The majority (66%) of respondents worked for unfamiliar commanders. Additionally, perhaps the most intriguing demographic statistic was that 45% of the deployed CCOs did not have primary mobility position numbers. This meant that their home units had not designated them as deployable CCOs for a national emergency. In some cases, designated CCOs remained at home while non-designees deployed. Only 54% of deployed CCOs were designated as the primary CCO.

Finally, the majority (82%) of AOR respondents worked at the provisional wing level performing contracting activities in direct support of an operational wing or wings. Fifteen percent of respondents engaged in staff level contracting activities.

Based on the data received, the average respondent was a male technical sergeant with eight years of experience, spent six months deployed, and worked directly for a provisional wing. Because the primary focus of this research is to examine CCO training, the backgrounds and knowledge base of the respondents was considered important. Detailed results are available in Appendix C.

Analysis of Investigative Questions

Investigative questions (IQs) were analyzed by grouping them with the appropriate survey questions. The survey questions that pertained to each investigative question were analyzed by using frequency distributions, means,

and standard deviations. A matrix displaying the survey questions corresponding to each IQ is provided at Appendix B. Survey respondents used a five point Likert type scale to answer questions 9 through 128. Different scales were used for each grouping. The same Likert type scale was used for each set of survey questions corresponding to a specific IQ. Statistics for each of these questions are presented in Appendix C. Questions 129 through 133 were open-ended opinion questions on various topics. The qualitative responses to these questions were analyzed by grouping convergent answers together. Divergent answers were grouped under the category *Miscellaneous*.

This section will list the investigative questions followed by a summary and analysis of the data collected through the e-mail survey and several interviews.

IQ-1. What level of experience did deployed CCOs possess with regard to training received from formal academic courses, base exercises, deployment exercises, and real world deployments? Analysis of survey questions related to this IQ revealed that deployed CCOs possessed limited training experience from the four areas mentioned. 90% of the respondents stated they had never received training from a formal academic course on contingency contracting. Additionally, on average, respondents had participated in only one base exercise that included contracting. 64% of the respondents reported they had never participated in a base exercise that included contingency contracting. Also, 64% said they had never participated in a deployment exercise that

practiced contingency contracting before ODS. 88% said they had no experience in real contingency operations prior to ODS. These responses indicate that deployed CCOs lacked the type of experience provided through contingency contracting training.

IQ-2. How did deployed CCOs perceive the quality of the training they received prior to ODS? Respondents generally rated the quality of training received before ODS as *poor*. The majority rated training received from formal academic courses, base exercises, and deployments as *non-existent*. When rating the coverage of contingency contracting in formal courses, the mean response was 4.73 or *non-existent*. Training received from involvement in base exercises and deployments was rated *poor* (3.93 and 3.95 respectively). While the means indicate poor quality, the median answer for all three questions was 5, indicating at least half of all respondents rated them as *non-existent*. Also, the mean response (3.81) for OJT training received was *poor*. Respondents had more favorable views of their regulatory knowledge. When asked to rate their own personal knowledge of contingency regulations before ODS, the mean response was between *fair* and *good* (2.78).

These questions revealed that contingency contracting training received was *poor* or *non-existent* in almost every category. The only category receiving better than *poor* ratings was knowledge of regulations. It is worth noting that this is the only category where respondents can train themselves by studying the regulations.

IQs 3 and 4. Did CCOs feel that the training they received from formal academic courses prior to ODS was worthwhile? Do CCOs feel training from formal academic courses is necessary? Analysis of survey questions related to these IQs revealed that respondents did not feel training received from formal courses prior to ODS was adequate. They also supported the necessity for formal academic courses to train CCOs in the future. When respondents were asked whether they thought formal academic courses prepared them for the duties of ODS, the mean response (1.8) was *strongly disagree* to *somewhat disagree*. 60% of respondents strongly disagreed that formal courses adequately prepared them for ODS. However, poor preparation received from formal courses did not reflect a negative view of courses themselves. The mean response for whether CCOs should receive more training from formal courses in the future was *somewhat agree* to *strongly agree* (4.37).

Responses indicate that contingency contracting training received from formal academic courses before ODS was not worthwhile. This is supported by answers from previous IQs that assessed training as *non-existent*. However, this did not preclude recommendations for formal academic courses to prepare CCOs for PPS requirements. A number of qualitative responses indicated additional support for a formal course (see Appendix D).

IQs 5 and 6. Did deployed CCOs feel that the training received from base exercises, deployments, and OJT prepared them for the requirements of ODS? Do CCOs feel additional training in base exercises, deployments and

OJT would improve their proficiency for operating under a Power Projection Strategy?

Base Exercises. Respondents generally felt that base exercises did not prepare them for the requirements of ODS, yet they felt more exercises would have improved their proficiency. They indicated more base exercise training prior to ODS as desirous. When asked if they wished they had more base exercise experience before deploying to ODS, the mean response (3.35) was *somewhat agree*. Additionally, 69% stated base exercise training received did not adequately prepare them for the requirements of ODS.

These responses indicated training received from base exercises was not helpful. However, more base exercise participation was desired. Additional exercises were felt to aide proficiency. There are two plausible explanations for this. Either the respondents did not receive base exercise training, or if they did, it was not conducted in a beneficial manner.

Deployment Exercises. Deployment answers were similar to those for base exercises. Respondents were discouraged with pre-ODS deployment exercises, yet desirous of more exercise participation. When respondents were asked if the training received from deployment exercises prepared them for ODS, the mean response (2.29) was *somewhat disagree*, indicating dissatisfaction with pre-ODS deployment exercises. 62% of respondents stated they wished they had more deployment training before ODS.

Similar to base exercises, respondents felt training received was not helpful but were desirous of more. Again, this indicates training was not conducted (in which case any participation would be more than previously received) or training improvement is necessary to make it more useful. Respondents desired more training, yet the benefits of training received are not evident.

On-the-Job Training (OJT). Respondents were asked similar questions about base exercises and deployments that evoked similar responses. When asked if their base OJT program prepared them for ODS, the mean was 2.53 or *somewhat disagree*. 60% wanted more contingency contracting OJT before ODS. These answers parallel the previous exercise and deployment training techniques in that respondents seem to question the value of the training received before ODS, yet wish they had received more.

Responses in the last three sub-sections on base exercises, deployments, and OJT, all parallel each other. As stated previously, the respondents seem to question the value of the training received in each category before ODS. However, they wish they had received more training before ODS. It is clear from previous IQ responses that many CCOs did not participate in some of these training methods and, therefore, rated their benefits as *poor*. However, another plausible explanation for this is that many respondents felt training could be valuable if conducted differently.

The qualitative responses to the question "describe your feelings regarding the statement, 'We trained like we fought'" (Appendix D, Question

132) support this explanation. Of those who participated in base exercises or deployments before ODS, 80% felt peacetime training did not prepare them for wartime realities. Many veteran CCOs expressed strong feelings about the inadequate preparation they received. Most made comments about the unrealistic nature of current exercises. CCOs indicated that they typically process through the mobility line with inadequate real-world deployment challenges. Several respondents believed wing leaders and exercise coordinators were uninformed about the valuable role CCOs play in a Power Projection scenario.

Although the majority of responses were critical of pre-ODS training efforts, 17% of the respondents expressed some support for the statement "We trained like we fought." Many of those providing positive responses had some real-world experience in joint exercises or disasters.

Overall, training conducted before ODS did not prepare the majority of deployed CCOs for the Persian Gulf PPS. Based on these responses, some changes may need to be made to the current CCO training methods to make them more effective.

IQ-7. Did CCOs feel the deployed wing command structure understood the capabilities and limitations of CCOs and provide support? Most respondents had positive views of both command support and understanding. When asked if they had problems getting support from their deployed wing commander, the mean response (2.0) was *somewhat disagree*, with 62% indicating they strongly disagreed. When asked if their deployed

wing commander understood contracting capabilities and limitations when they arrived in the AOR, the mean response was 3, indicating no clear agreement or disagreement. This indicates CCOs believed some deployed wing commanders had a good understanding of contracting capabilities and limitations while some CCOs believed that their deployed wing commander did not. The mean response for wing commanders gaining an understanding of contracting capabilities and limitations as time passed (3.68) was *somewhat agree*.

As a whole, the respondents did not appear to have problems getting support from their deployed wing commanders, despite the fact that most worked for commanders unfamiliar to them before ODS. However, qualitative responses dealing with war stories indicated several instances of commanders being unfamiliar with CCO capabilities and limitations (see Appendix D).

Overall, most commanders were supportive of their CCOs. However, some commander's lack of knowledge of contracting capabilities and limitations inhibited their CCOs ability to effectively support the wing mission.

IQ-8. Do CCOs feel their current wing command structure understands contingency contracting capabilities and limitations? When respondents were asked if their current logistics group commander understood contingency contracting capabilities and limitations, the mean response was 3.48 or *somewhat agree*. However, 51% of respondents rated this response as

neutral, suggesting some difficulty in assessing the current wing command structure's comprehension of contingency contracting. When asked if their current wing commander understands contingency contracting capabilities and limitations, the mean response was 3.31 with 53% rating it neutral.

Although the responses seem to indicate wing leadership has some understanding of contracting capabilities and limitations, there was no clear pattern of agreement or disagreement on this issue from most respondents. This may be a function of limited CCO peacetime exposure to that level of command. Therefore, they are potentially unable to ascertain the level of expertise the command structure possesses.

IQ-9. What topics do CCOs believe need the most emphasis in preparation for a Power Projection Strategy? This question was addressed by survey questions 36 through 120 (see Appendix A). A list of possible CCO training topics was given to all respondents to rate using a Likert type scale. The mean, standard deviation, and variance were calculated for each topic. A t-test was then conducted to determine which topics respondents believed were most significant. All means calculated were above 3, indicating agreement. However, to find the most significant items, the test statistic compared each mean to the value of 4 from the Likert type scale. The value of 4 was chosen because it represents definite agreement on the scale. This test measured whether the calculated mean of each item was greater than 4 at a 99% confidence level. Using this value from the scale and a 99% confidence level significantly reduced the chance of a Beta error, or finding something is

significant when it is not. Based on this test, respondents found that fifty of the eighty five topics were highly significant and should be the most prominent areas of concentration in any contingency contracting training. Table 1 contains the ten topics rated most significant by the respondents in order of importance. Remaining data is presented in Appendix C.

Table 1
Top Ten Significant Training Topics

Topic	Category	Description
1. Services	Types of Contingency Contracting	How to create and modify service contracts for short term contingencies.
2. Communication Lines (Fax, phone radio, etc)	Setting up Shop	What communication is needed immediately and how to get it.
3. Use of SF 44s	Contracting Instruments	How to most effectively use these forms and what dollar limits apply.
4. Currency issues	Country Unique Issues	Exchange rates, normal payment procedures for business, bank assistance
5. Use of blanket purchase agreements	Contracting Instruments	How to set up and use efficiently (i.e. faxing price lists and quotes)
6. Host nation support agreements	Country Unique Issues	What are they, how to establish and use them.
7. Commodities	Types of Contingency Contracting	Rules and dollar threshold changes to normal practices.
8. Obtaining a vehicle	Setting up Shop	Where to look, what type is necessary.
9. Finance issues and procedures	Coordination	Procedures for carrying cash, signing receipts etc.
10. Procurement integrity in a contingency	Planning and Preparation	How to deal with bribes, kickbacks, and other questionable situations

IQ-10. Which medium of training do CCOs perceive is the most effective? This IQ was answered by asking respondents to rank order the four contingency contracting training methods in order of effectiveness. The results are listed in Table 2 below.

Table 2

Rank of Most Effective Training Method

	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>	<i>Summary of Ranks</i>
<i>Deployment Exercises</i>	1	2.30	1.28	67
<i>Formal Courses</i>	2	2.60	.99	76
<i>OJT Program</i>	3	3.09	.87	81
<i>Base Exercises</i>	4	2.03	1.04	100

The rank order is supported by quantitative and qualitative data collected in other parts of the survey. Deployment exercises appear to be favored the most because CCOs indicate that they create the most realistic scenarios. Respondents who participated in actual deployments noted that these were the primary reason they felt prepared for ODS. The second ranking of formal courses is supported by the many requests for a formal CCO training course. The base exercises ranking of last is reflected in the numerous negative comments received about the unrealistic nature of CCOs requirements in current exercises. It is interesting to note that some of the more positive comments about new training initiatives (Appendix D,

Question 129) deal with revamping base exercises to reflect a Power Projection scenario. Organizations that have restructured CCO base exercise training through the use of forward operating locations, the use of real work, and operating under contingency rules suggest that base exercises are now a valuable method of training.

In summary, the results of this rank order should be interpreted in light of current circumstances. Even though base exercises are rated last, they can still be a valuable training method. Respondents indicated all of these training methods are valuable when the training includes pertinent topics under realistic conditions.

IQ-11. Which tools did CCOs feel were most critical to performing their mission? ODS CCOs went to war facing cumbersome manual information and contract processing. CCOs were generally not equipped with the proper tools to support a Power Projection Strategy. This issue was addressed by asking respondents to rank order the four primary CCO automation tools in order of priority. The results are listed in Table 3.

Although equipment needs appeared to vary depending on individual situations, respondents strongly indicated the most important piece of equipment a CCO needs is a cellular telephone. This piece of equipment was most critical for those who had trouble getting off base to conduct business for security reasons, and those whose only office was their vehicle.

Table 3

Rank of Most Critical Equipment or Tool

	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>	<i>Summary of Ranks</i>
<i>Cellular Phone</i>	1	1.91	1.16	65
<i>Fax Machine</i>	2	2.47	.96	84
<i>Laptop Computer</i>	3	2.67	1.7	85
<i>Portable Copier</i>	4	3.32	1.49	103

The second highest rated automation tool was the facsimile machine. ODS CCOs saved time by faxing requirements descriptions to stores and receiving quotes instead of driving up to an hour to town and going from shop to shop to get quotes. Also, many towns near the CCOs base were very small. It was sometimes necessary to contact larger cities to find the required items. Long distance sourcing was facilitated by the fax machine.

Laptop computers were the third highest ranked tool. During ODS computers were necessary to track and log purchase requests and orders placed with vendors. Some locations had as many as 1500 open purchase requests at a time. With this number of open items in the manually logged system, it was practically impossible to give organizations status on their orders, or find previous purchase histories for items. Many CCOs did not deploy with computer support. However, when they returned to their home unit, they requested that a laptop computer become part of their unit's deployment kit. This is especially important because a new computer

program that performs the data tracking functions in a deployed environment was recently developed by the Air Force Logistics Management Agency.

The fourth ranked automation tool was portable copiers. ODS CCOs needed to make copies of documents for files and distribute requests for proposals (RFPs) and completed contracts to potential bidders and contract awardees. The portable copier machine ranking does not diminish its importance. This rank order simply indicates that, given a preference, CCOs would prefer the tools in the order given.

IQ-12. What are the perceptions of CCOs regarding training initiatives implemented since ODS? To answer this investigative question, CCOs were asked to "List any relevant training initiatives your base or command has implemented since your return from Desert Storm/Shield that you feel are beneficial to contingency contracting officers." The responses were grouped into three categories as presented in Table 4.

Most negative responses simply stated that no serious training programs had evolved since ODS. Those indicating new training initiatives varied from relatively minor changes such as training more people to major changes to command-wide training programs. Several responses indicated they had received the new AFLMC handbooks. Some of the more innovative programs included the setting up of forward operating locations where CCOs worked actual requirements in a deployed environment.

Table 4

Training Initiatives Implemented Since ODS

<i>Category</i>	<i>Number of Responses</i>	<i>Percentage of Responses</i>
<i>No new initiatives since ODS</i>	22	55%
<i>New initiatives since CDS</i>	16	40%
<i>Miscellaneous</i>	2	5%

Interviews with Air Combat Command (ACC) and Air Mobility Command (AMC) headquarters (see Appendix E) indicated that the war-fighting commands are developing comprehensive programs to train, equip, and structure contingency contracting to meet ODS identified needs. ACC, in particular, appears to be leading the way in these efforts. Recent developments include: the creation of new Unit Type Codes (UTCs) for different CCO team sizes; training Individual Mobility Augmentees (IMAs) to form quick deployment teams; testing the use of credit cards for contingency use; prototyping of specialized laptop/fax/cellular phone kits; and implementation of a command-wide training program. Interviews with the Air Education and Training Command (AETC) contracting school at Lowry AFB indicate that a limited amount of contingency contracting training will be incorporated into the three, five, and seven level courses in the next year. However, no Air Force specific officer training in contingency contracting is projected (see Appendix E).

Since a number of comprehensive training initiatives are being worked, the negative replies received on this question indicate two possible concerns. First, many of the new training initiatives have not reached the CCOs working in the field. The second implication is that operational contracting squadrons are still conducting *business as usual* instead of moving beyond the old CCO training paradigm of mobility processing and augmentee duties. Even bases that are trying to approach CCO training in a more realistic manner express concern over still being tasked with mobility augmentee duties. Those that are integrating realistic CCO training into base exercises and deployments indicate that such training is very beneficial.

IQ-13. What experiences did CCOs encounter that they believe would be beneficial crossfeed information for future training initiatives? To answer this investigative question, survey participants were asked to "Describe your most unique contracting challenge from your Desert Shield/Storm experience and how you dealt with it" and "Describe a scenario you feel would be useful for training CCOs during a base exercise or deployment." The responses to this question varied greatly.

The first question resulted in the recollection of wide variety of war stories. The responses groupings are summarized in Table 5. The largest grouping of these responses explained how CCOs came up with creative solutions to difficult problems. Seven CCOs elaborated on difficulties encountered with their chain of command in accomplishing tasks. Another large grouping consisted of stories that dealt with unique cultural issues such

as the religious observations of Ramadan and the slow pace of Saudi action. There were several responses that dealt with initial deployment concerns, host nation support, terminations and claims, situations that raised ethical concerns, and funding issues.

Table 5
Experiences Suited for Crossfeed

<i>Category</i>	<i>Number of Responses</i>	<i>Percentage of Responses</i>
<i>Creative Solutions</i>	17	36%
<i>Problem Commanders</i>	7	15%
<i>Cultural Realities</i>	7	15%
<i>Getting Started</i>	3	6%
<i>Host Nation Support</i>	3	6%
<i>Terminations and Claims</i>	3	6%
<i>Compromising Positions</i>	3	6%
<i>Money Matters</i>	2	4%
<i>Miscellaneous</i>	3	6%

The second question resulted in the collection of a number of scenarios useful for future training. These scenarios were grouped into the categories in Table 6.

The largest grouping focussed on scenarios that simulated a bare-base environment and/or the setting up shop to support an initial deployment. The other groupings dealt with issues such as promoting cross-functional interaction and actual working.

Table 6

Future Training Scenarios

<i>Category</i>	<i>Number of Responses</i>	<i>Percentage of Responses</i>
<i>Focus on initial deployment issues</i>	9	26%
<i>Simulate a forward operating location</i>	5	14%
<i>Promote cross-functional interaction</i>	5	14%
<i>Do actual work</i>	5	14%
<i>Miscellaneous</i>	11	31%

The war stories and scenarios respondents listed could be used by trainers at the base, command, and academic levels. Base-level trainers can tailor these stories and scenarios for use in exercises, deployments, and office training sessions as case studies. Command staffers can use these stories and scenarios in preparing command-wide training materials and for use by Inspector General teams during readiness inspections. Finally, formal academic course developers can incorporate these stories and scenarios into case studies and use them as teaching examples to stress real-life applications.

IQ-14. What suggestions do CCOs have for improving contingency contracting training? This question was answered by the question "List any further ideas you feel would be beneficial for training contingency officers in the future" (see Appendix D for complete listing). Resulting categories are presented in Table 7. The typical response recommended the creation of a formal course on contingency contracting. A number of responses also

suggested making organizational changes in the way CCOs are assigned and deployed. Four responses emphasized the need for training logistics and wing commanders on contingency contracting capabilities and limitations. There were also four responses that dealt with money matters and two that encouraged the acquisition of better tools for future deployments. The remaining replies dealt with a wide variety of divergent issues such as understanding the military transportation system and attitude necessary to work as a CCO.

Table 7

Suggested Improvements for the Future

<i>Category</i>	<i>Number of Responses</i>	<i>Percentage of Responses</i>
<i>Start a formal class</i>	14	30%
<i>Organizational Dynamics</i>	7	15%
<i>Train commanders on contingency contracting</i>	4	9%
<i>Money Matters</i>	4	9%
<i>Tools of the Trade</i>	2	4%
<i>Miscellaneous</i>	15	33%

Chapter Summary

This chapter reported the results of a survey instrument and several interviews. The combined results indicate that inadequacies exist in wartime contingency contracting training. The final chapter presents some conclusions regarding these problems and recommends corrective action to make improvements in these areas.

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction

Changing world conditions have forced the U.S. military to adopt and support the new Power Projection Strategy. This strategy demands that military forces be able to deploy quickly, in overwhelming strength, and conduct a decisive campaign against an aggressor. The success of this strategy lies in large part on the logistics capabilities of the forces. This study demonstrates that one part of the logistics community, theater-based contingency contracting, needs training improvements due to its critical role in supporting a Power Projection Strategy. Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) deployed under this strategy must be effectively prepared to provide the critical support demanded. The following discussion consists of the major conclusions drawn from this study, recommendations for improving CCO training, study limitations, and suggestions for further study.

Conclusions

The information provided by the respondents in this study demonstrated that deployed CCOs were generally not trained to support the requirements of a Power Projection Strategy (PPS). Formal academic course instruction was almost non-existent, On-the-Job training (OJT) needed improvement, and participation in base and deployment exercises, if experienced at all, did not provide realistic challenges for CCOs to gain

proficiency. Several training initiatives are being studied at major commands, and education centers are considering the addition of contingency contracting material to current courses. These initiatives have yet to reach the field. Based on the data received, CCOs felt that current training does not meet the needs of a Power Projection Strategy.

Formal Courses. This study confirms the need for formal academic training on contingency contracting. Formal courses do not cover contingency contracting, as suggested by education center curriculum reviews. It is necessary for CCOs to know which regulations and laws change in contingencies. Also, CCOs must learn how to single-handedly support deployed units when every request is an emergency and manual record keeping is required. Finally, CCOs must learn what to expect when doing business in unfamiliar countries, and how best to prepare for these circumstances before they arrive.

Respondents ranked formal academic training second only to deployments as the best training method. Since actual deployments are limited in number, not all CCOs get the opportunity to participate in them. Certain basic contracting courses, on the other hand, are required for all contracting personnel. Therefore, incorporating contingency contracting training in enlisted and officer courses would assure that all CCOs receive exposure to critical CCO topics.

An option to teaching contingency contracting as part of other courses would be the creation of course covering Air Force contingency contracting.

Respondents strongly supported the creation of a separate course specifically targeted at contingency contracting. The number of training topics rated as significant indicates the need for a comprehensive course. This course could expose CCOs to a centralized wealth of knowledge which is now scattered throughout the Air Force in the experiences of individuals. It would also provide a forum where officers and NCOs can learn as a team.

Base Exercises. Contracting involvement in base exercises consisted primarily of processing through mobility lines and then returning to the office while the rest of the base practiced the employment phase. This type of scenario not only gives CCOs little opportunity to practice contingency contracting, but also robs other base organizations of interaction with contracting. Without this practice, everyone starts from scratch in a real operation. The learning curve is much too steep to start the interaction from an airstrip in a foreign country. Contracting should play a more practical role in base exercises. At a minimum, they initiate and educate others on how CCOs can fill their requirements in a deployment situation.

Deployments. Respondents also suggested that deployments do not reflect real-world Power Projection Scenarios for contracting support. Frequently, CCOs are sent to a deployment area weeks in advance of the exercising population to "get everything ready." When the rest of the players arrive the CCOs work is finished and he or she spends the remaining time filling minor requirements.

Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS) demonstrated that this is not the way real-world deployments occur. In actual Power Projection situations, CCOs are on one of the first aircraft entering the area (or should be). They enter an environment with uncertainty and chaos as every organization is trying to set up shop and hands them emergency requirements on *post it* note paper. The CCOs typically have no communication, transportation, office, or knowledge of the local business community. Although simulation of this exact type of environment during deployments may not be possible, the current training methods do not provide realistic training for CCOs.

On-the-Job (OJT) Training. Some base OJT programs provide guidance on contingency contracting. However, respondents felt that if it was covered at all, the training was inadequate for contingency requirements. Typically, base OJT programs consisted of little more than semi-annually meeting regulatory requirements.

Base Mobility Preparation. This study revealed that only 50% of the deployed CCOs were designated by their home units as primary CCOs. This indicates ineffective preparation on the part of contracting units to support contingencies. In many cases, the people holding primary mobility position numbers (MPNs), and individuals designated to go to emergencies, were considered too important to the home office to send. As such, their alternates (who in most cases had never even practiced processing through a mobility line) were deployed. This meant that whatever training the primary individuals had received was ineffective because they did not deploy. Instead,

individuals that never received training, including basic gas mask training in some cases, were expected to perform the primary's duties.

Post ODS Training Initiatives. Although some major commands are redirecting their CCO training, equipping, and structure, the implementation process is moving slowly at the base level, if at all. Air Combat Command has targeted numerous initiatives for training CCOs. Implementation of many initiatives has been slow due to attempts to coordinate changes with other commands and create some uniform guidance for all Air Force CCOs. As such, respondents in the field have seen very slow, sporadic initiatives on CCO training. Their responses indicate that no clear path or plan for improving CCO training can be seen at the *working level*.

Contracting Tools. Deployable automation tools are necessary to enhance CCOs effectiveness in a PPS. Cellular phones, laptop computers, and fax machines are as important to the deployed CCO as precision weapons are to a fighter pilot. These tools help the CCO focus on creative ways to acquire a wing's support instead of developing elaborate manual filing systems or wasting precious time traveling from business to business.

Key Areas of Training. Respondents indicated a lack of contingency contracting training in critical areas. These areas are identified in Chapter Four and Appendix C. Examination of the most important issues identified by respondents revealed that they tended to be issues encountered in the very earliest phases of deployments. When units first arrive in a new location under a Power Projection Strategy, they are faced with confusion and

disorientation as all organizations scramble to set up operations. It is this element of uncertainty that CCOs do not receive from current training.

Respondents indicated the need to train CCOs to effectively deal with these situations and plan for them accordingly. The key training topics for a PPS are now identified and ready for use in preparing new training initiatives.

Commander Awareness. Although most commanders gave needed support to deployed CCOs, some wing and logistics group commanders were relatively unaware of CCO capabilities and limitations. This lack of understanding sometimes became an impediment to the CCO's ability to adequately support the needs of the commander and his unit. Some respondents indicated restraints placed on them confounded their ability to meet the commander's demands. Although not all commanders restrained CCOs, it is clear that command personnel need to be aware of what CCOs can and cannot do for them in a contingency situation.

Use of Electronic Mail for Data Gathering. Although electronic mail (e-mail) is still relatively untested for gathering data, it was an effective method of collecting data for this research effort. This method increased the population size through the *snowballing* technique, was timely, and saved the postage and printing costs of traditional methods. It also resulted in a relatively high response rate with individuals accessed directly having roughly double the response rate as those accessed through a third person. The major drawback of an e-mail survey was the inherent risk of lost data associated with any computer system malfunction.

Recommendations

Study respondents provided excellent inputs and recommendations that would greatly improve contingency contracting officer training for a Power Projection Strategy. Listed below are the recommendations that the researchers feel should be strongly considered for implementation by contracting organizations throughout the Air Force.

Create a Formal CCO Course. A formal course should be created to teach CCOs about the requirements and demands of contingency contracting for a Power Projection Strategy. The course should incorporate the topics respondents felt were important as listed in Appendix C and make use of the scenarios and experiences provided in Appendix D. The course should be required for all contracting personnel assigned a primary mobility position number.

Improve On-the-Job (OJT) Training. As demographic data indicated, the majority of deployed CCOs were enlisted and held the rank of technical sergeant or above. Therefore, a training block on contingency contracting should be added to five and seven level Career Development Courses. This would improve the practical knowledge of CCOs gained through the OJT program and ensure continued currency of that knowledge.

Use Scenarios to Supplement Training Efforts. This study compiled a wide variety of CCO training scenarios and real-life experiences. These scenarios and war stories should be distributed to command staffs, base level

trainers, and course developers for use in training programs and creating inputs to wing exercises and deployments.

Increase CCO Involvement in Exercises. CCOs should be an active participant in all base deployments and exercises that simulate Power Projection scenarios. Those personnel in contracting units with primary MPNs should not only process through the mobility line but also set up a field office to support all requirements generated as a result of the exercise. Base organizations should be forced to interact with contracting personnel by submitting emergency requirements. CCOs should follow wartime procedures, regulations, and train using the whatever deployable tools they have available for use.

During deployment exercises, CCOs should not be sent ahead of deploying units to prepare for their arrival. Instead, they should arrive with the unit itself and experience the demands of a realistic deployment.

Review Mobility Assignments. If at all possible, the importance of an individual to an organization should be determined well in advance of any contingency. If the person is too important to the home office, they should not hold a primary mobility number.

Enhance Commander Training. Logistics and wing commanders should receive training on CCO capabilities and limitations. A brief training block on contingency contracting should be presented to senior officers during professional military education (PME) courses and commander orientation courses. Additionally, contracting squadrons should brief their local

commanders on the capabilities and limitations of CCOs in a wartime environment.

Consider the Use of Electronic Mail for Data Collection. Electronic mail is recommended for use when the population sample targeted for study is directly accessible. E-mail is especially useful in applying the *snowball* technique to identify sample populations. The ability to download type-written data also makes it an ideal time saver for surveys that require lengthy written replies such as the Delphi technique.

Study Limitations

This study specifically focussed on a Power Projection scenario. Readers should be careful not to make generalizations from this study to other contingency contracting scenarios such as disasters and humanitarian aid efforts. Additionally, ODS may not be a perfect model for all future PPS scenarios. Although CCOs dealt with vast cultural differences during ODS, most of the material and services required were readily available in the markets of major Middle East cities. Some regions of the world may not have the same availability of valuable goods and services.

Suggestions for Further Study

This research effort was broad in nature due to the relatively small amount of research previously conducted on the topic. Many issues associated with wartime contingency contracting training lend themselves to

additional study in future research projects. Some of these areas include adapting automation tools to deployed environments, the structure of initial CCO deployment teams, pre-deployment training of unit ordering personnel, and the use of decentralized purchasing vehicles such as credit cards. Also, a comparative analysis of the results of this study to CCO support of humanitarian efforts such as Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia may identify different CCO training needs than this study.

Appendix A: Survey Instrument

The following pages display the survey instrument as it appeared on the computer screens of the survey participants.

To:	TSgt Joe Contracting	WARRIOR AFB
From:	Capt Jon B. Tigges	Security: Limited
Subject:	CCO Survey (Part 1)	Date Received: 03/19/93

Air Force Institute of Technology
Survey of Desert Shield/Storm
Contingency Contracting Officers

-- INTRODUCTION --

You've been identified as one of a group of contracting personnel who deployed to support Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Contingency contracting officers played a pivotal role in the success of this effort. Because of this, the Air Staff, Air Combat Command, and other key organizations are interested in looking at ways to make contingency contracting even more

To:	TSgt Joe Contracting	WARRIOR AFB
From:	Capt Jon B. Tigges	Security: Limited
Subject:	CCO Survey (Part 1)	Date Received: 03/19/93

interested in looking at ways to make contingency contracting even more effective in future conflicts. Therefore, Capt Tom Snyder and myself are conducting a research study to aid in improving contingency contracting training.

We're conducting this survey using electronic mail to decrease postage costs and increase the timeliness of responses. Because of space limitations in the Wang e-mail system, this survey is broken into three separate messages. When you've finished reading this introductory section, please go to the message title "CCO Survey (Part 2)" and complete the questions as directed.

The purpose of this questionnaire is to obtain information about your

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 1) Date Received: 03/19/93

The purpose of this questionnaire is to obtain information about your deployment experiences during Operation Desert Shield/Storm and to get your opinion about the training of contingency contracting officers (CCOs) in the Air Force.

Be assured that all information you provide will be held in the strictest confidence. Your responses will NOT be provided to your superiors or any other agency. Study results will be presented only in terms of group averages or consensus opinions. Published results will NOT identify specific individuals or groups.

Please reply NLT 30 March.

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 1) Date Received: 03/19/93

Please reply NLT 30 March.

Thanks for your help!

Capt Jon Tigges and Capt Tom Snyder

P.S. If you have any questions, don't hesitate to send us a message and we'll get you an answer.

- PRIVACY ACT INFORMATION -

In accordance with paragraph 30, AFR 12-35, the following information

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 1) Date Received: 03/19/93

In accordance with paragraph 30, AFR 12-35, the following information is provided by the Privacy Act of 1974:

a. Authority;

- (1) 5 USC 301, Departmental Regulations; and
- (2) 10 USC 8012, Secretary of the Air Force, Powers, Duties, Delegations by Compensation; and
- (3) DoD Instruction 1100.13, 17 Apr 68, Surveys of Department of Defense Personnel; and

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 1) Date Received: 03/19/93

(4) AFR 30-23, 22 Sep 76, Air Force Personnel Survey Program.

b. Principle purposes. The survey is being conducted to collect information for use in research aimed at providing information to solve problems of interest to the Air Force and DoD.

c. Routine uses. The survey data will be used in research of contingency contracting training. Results of the research will be included in published articles, reports, or texts. Distribution of results will be unlimited.

d. Participation in this survey is voluntary.

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 1) Date Received: 03/19/93

d. Participation in this survey is voluntary.

e. No adverse action of any kind may be taken against any individual who elects not to participate in any or all of this study.

- KEY DEFINITIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS SURVEY -

1. Contingency Contracting: Contracting actions taking place within the theater of operations in preparation for and execution of wartime requirements.

2. Base Exercise: Scenarios acted out at or near a CCO's home base to train individuals for wartime contingencies.

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 1) Date Received: 03/19/93

individuals for wartime contingencies.

3. Deployment Exercise: Scenarios acted out physically deployed from a CCO's home base to train individuals for wartime contingencies.

4. Formal Academic Course: A classroom course covering contracting topics (such as Contract Administration, Contract Law, etc.).

5. On-the-Job Training (OJT): Training one receives through the OJT program. This includes Career Development Courses (CDCs), hands-on training by experienced personnel, and informal office training courses.

6. Area of Responsibility (AOR): The Southwest Asia theater of operations

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 1) Date Received: 03/19/93

6. Area of Responsibility (AOR): The Southwest Asia theater of operations and those provisional bases directly supporting combat operations.

Please go now to your next message titled "CCO Survey (Part 2)."

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 2) Date Received: 03/19/93

DIRECTIONS FOR ANSWERING QUESTIONS: Please take a few minutes now and answer these questions using the Wang E-mail system as follows:

1. Hit the (shift) F1 key to edit this message.
2. Type in "JON TIGGES" in the "To:" address block above.
3. Answer each multiple choice question by entering your selection in the [] box at the bottom right of each question. For example, if your answer is "d", type the letter "d" in the [] so that it looks like [d].

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 2) Date Received: 03/19/93

- BACKGROUND INFORMATION -

This section deals with personal background characteristics. This information will be used to obtain a picture of the typical deployed CCO.

1. Your rank is:

a. E-1 to E-4	b. E-5 to E-6	c. E-7 to E-9
d. O-1 to O-3	e. O-4 or above	d. Civilian[]
2. Total years of experience in contracting at the time your deployment was:

To: TSgt Joe Contracting
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 2)

WARRIOR AFB
Security: Limited
Date Received: 03/19/93

your deployment was:

- a. Less than 1 yr b. 1-2 yrs c. 3-4 yrs d. 5-6 yrs
e. 7-8 yrs f. 9-10 yrs g. More than 10 yrs[]

3. Your sex is:

- a. Male b. Female[]

4. Your total time spent in the area of Operations during Desert Shield/Storm was:

- a. Less than 1 month b. 1-2 months c. 3-4 months

To: TSgt Joe Contracting
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 2)

WARRIOR AFB
Security: Limited
Date Received: 03/19/93

- a. Less than 1 month b. 1-2 months c. 3-4 months
d. 5-6 months e. 7-8 months f. More than 8 months []

5. You were deployed to the AOR during:

- a. Desert Shield
b. Desert Storm
c. Desert Calm
d. Desert Shield and Desert Storm
e. Desert Storm and Desert Calm
f. Desert Shield/Storm and Desert Calm
g. Operation Provide Comfort[]

To: TSgt Joe Contracting
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 2)

WARRIOR AFB
Security: Limited
Date Received: 03/19/93

- g. Operation Provide Comfort[]

6. Your wing commander at your deployed location was the same commander you worked under at your home base before deploying.

- a. Yes b. No[]

7. Before Desert Shield, did you hold a contingency contracting mobility position number.

- a. Yes b. No[]

8. During your deployment, which of the following best describes your working

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 2) Date Received: 03/19/93

8. During your deployment, which of the following best describes your working location:

a. CENTCOM b. CENTAF c. Provisional Wing d. Other[]

- EXPERIENCE -

The following statements deal with your opinion regarding contingency contracting training. Based on your personal experience and opinion, use

the following scale to indicate your answer to each question.

9. Before deploying, how many formal academic courses did you attend that included training on contingency contracting.

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 2) Date Received: 03/19/93

that included training on contingency contracting.

a. None b. One c. Two d. Three e. More than three ...[]

10. Before deploying to the AOR, how many base exercises did you participate in which you practiced contingency contracting?

a. None b. One c. Two d. Three e. More than three ..[]

11. Before deploying to the ACR, how many deployment exercises did you participate in as a contingency contracting officer?

a. None b. One c. Two d. Three e. More than three ..[]

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 2) Date Received: 03/19/93

a. None b. One c. Two d. Three e. More than three ..[]

12. Before deploying to the ACR, how many deployments did you participate in that were not exercises (i.e. Grenada, Operation Just Cause)?

a. None b. One c. Two d. Three e. More than three ..[]

- QUALITY OF TRAINING -

The following scale applies to questions 9 - 15.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Excellent Good Fair Poor Non Existent

To:	TSgt Joe Contracting	WARRIOR AFB
From:	Capt Jon B. Tigges	Security: Limited
Subject:	CCO Survey (Part 2)	Date Received: 03/19/93

13. How would you describe the coverage of contingency contracting in the formal academic courses you took prior to Desert Shield?[]

14. How would you describe your knowledge of contingency contracting regulations such as AFR 70-7 prior to Desert Shield/Storm?[]

15. How would you describe your training in contingency contracting from the OJT program at your base prior to Desert Shield/Storm?[]

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Excellent Good Fair Poor Non Existent

To:	TSgt Joe Contracting	WARRIOR AFB
From:	Capt Jon B. Tigges	Security: Limited
Subject:	CCO Survey (Part 2)	Date Received: 03/19/93

Excellent Good Fair Poor Non Existent

16. How would you describe the training you received in contingency contracting from your involvement in base exercises?[]

17. How would you describe the training you received from performing contingency contracting during a deployment exercise?[]

- FORMAL ACADEMIC COURSES -

The following scale applies to questions 16 - 31.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

To:	TSgt Joe Contracting	WARRIOR AFB
From:	Capt Jon B. Tigges	Security: Limited
Subject:	CCO Survey (Part 2)	Date Received: 03/19/93

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly Somewhat Neither Disagree Somewhat Strongly

Disagree Disagree or Agree agree agree

18. Formal academic courses prepared me for contingency contracting duties during Desert Shield/Storm.[]

19. Contingency contracting officers should receive more training from formal academic courses to help them prepare for wartime contingencies. .[]

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly Somewhat Neither Disagree Somewhat Strongly

Disagree Disagree or Agree Agree Agree

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
 From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
 Subject: CCO Survey (Part 2) Date Received: 03/19/93

20. When contingency contracting is taught in a formal academic course, it should be taught as a separate course and NOT as a part of another course. []

21. Additional formal academic training on contingency contracting is NOT really worthwhile.[]

- BASE EXERCISES -

1-----	2-----	3-----	4-----	5-----
Strongly	Somewhat	Neither Disagree	Somewhat	Strongly
Disagree	Disagree	or Agree	Agree	Agree

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
 From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
 Subject: CCO Survey (Part 2) Date Received: 03/19/93

22. More contingency contracting training during base exercises would NOT have improved my proficiency during Desert Shield/Storm.[]

23. I wish I had more contingency contracting training from base exercises before deploying to the AOR.[]

24. The contingency contracting training I received during base exercises prepared me for the requirements of Desert Shield/Storm.[]

- DEPLOYMENT EXERCISES -

1-----	2-----	3-----	4-----	5-----
--------	--------	--------	--------	--------

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
 From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
 Subject: CCO Survey (Part 2) Date Received: 03/19/93

1-----	2-----	3-----	4-----	5-----
Strongly	Somewhat	Neither Disagree	Somewhat	Strongly
Disagree	Disagree	or Agree	Agree	Agree

25. The contingency contracting training I received during deployment exercises prepared me for the requirements of Desert Shield/Storm.[]

26. More contingency contracting training during deployment exercises would NOT have improved my proficiency during Desert Shield/Storm.[]

27. I wish I had more contingency contracting training from deployments before deploying to Desert Shield/Storm.[]

To:	TSgt Joe Contracting	WARRIOR AFB
From:	Capt Jon B. Tigges	Security: Limited
Subject:	CCC Survey (Part 2)	Date Received: 03/19/93

- ON-THE-JOB (OJT) TRAINING PROGRAM -

1-----	2-----	3-----	4-----	5-----
Strongly	Somewhat	Neither Disagree	Somewhat	Strongly
Disagree	Disagree	or Agree	Agree	Agree

28. More OJT would NOT have improved my proficiency during Desert Shield/Storm.[]

29. I wish I had received more contingency contracting OJT before deploying to the AOR.[]

To:	TSgt Joe Contracting	WARRIOR AFB
From:	Capt Jon B. Tigges	Security: Limited
Subject:	CCO Survey (Part 2)	Date Received: 03/19/93

30. My home base OJT program prepared me for the requirements of Desert Shield/Storm.[]

- COMMANDER INTERFACE -

1-----	2-----	3-----	4-----	5-----
Strongly	Somewhat	Neither Disagree	Somewhat	Strongly
Disagree	Disagree	or Agree	Agree	Agree

31. I had problems getting support from my deployed wing commander.[]

32. When I arrived in the AOR, my deployed wing commander understood

To:	TSgt Joe Contracting	WARRIOR AFB
From:	Capt Jon B. Tigges	Security: Limited
Subject:	CCO Survey (Part 2)	Date Received: 03/19/93

32. When I arrived in the AOR, my deployed wing commander understood contracting capabilities and limitations.[]

33. As time passed, my deployed wing commander gained an understanding of contracting capabilities and limitations.[]

34. My current Logistics Group Commander understands contingency contracting capabilities and limitations.[]

35. My current wing commander understands contingency contracting capabilities and limitations.[]

- TRAINING TOPICS -

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
 From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
 Subject: CCO Survey (Part 2) Date Received: 03/19/93

- TRAINING TOPICS -

The next section lists possible topics that could be included in contingency contracting training. Using the scale provided, pick the number that best reflects your agreement or disagreement with the following statement:

CCO training for a Desert Shield/Storm scenario should include more on:

Category - Planning and Preparation

1-----	2-----	3-----	4-----	5-----
Strongly	Somewhat	Neither Disagree	Somewhat	Strongly
Disagree	Disagree	or Agree	Agree	Agree

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
 From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
 Subject: CCO Survey (Part 2) Date Received: 03/19/93

- 36. How to train wing commanders on the role of CCOs.[]
- 37. How to conduct a site survey.[]
- 38. Understanding legal authority under emergency conditions.[]
- 39. Understanding operational plans.[]
- 40. Understanding the mobilization and deployment process.[]
- 41. Procurement integrity in a contingency.[]
- 42. Understanding the role and availability of pre-positioned supplies. []
- 43. How to establish a pre-deployment listing of critical requirements. []

Category - Country-Unique Issues

1-----	2-----	3-----	4-----	5-----
Strongly	Somewhat	Neither Disagree	Somewhat	Strongly
Disagree	Disagree	or Agree	Agree	Agree

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
 From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
 Subject: CCO Survey (Part 2) Date Received: 03/19/93

Strongly	Somewhat	Neither Disagree	Somewhat	Strongly
Disagree	Disagree	or Agree	Agree	Agree

- 44. Host nation support agreements.[]
- 45. Basic conversational phrases.[]
- 46. Cultural issues (i.e. taboos, customs).[]
- 47. Dress issues.[]
- 48. Currency issues.[]
- 49. Makeup of local economy.[]
- 50. Electricity concerns.[]
- 51. History of region.[]

Category - Coordination

To:	TSgt Joe Contracting	WARRIOR AFB
From:	Capt Jon B. Tigges	Security: Limited
Subject:	CCO Survey (Part 2)	Date Received: 03/19/93

Category - Coordination

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Strongly Somewhat Neither Disagree Somewhat Strongly
Disagree Disagree or Agree Agree Agree

52. Working with the U.S. Embassy.[]

53. Working with the other branches of the U.S. armed forces.[]

54. Mutual support agreements with other nations.[]

55. Transportation issues and procedures.[]

56. Supply issues and procedures.[]

57. Services issues and procedures.[]

58. Finance issues and procedures.[]

59. MWR issues and procedures.[]

To:	TSgt Joe Contracting	WARRIOR AFB
From:	Capt Jon B. Tigges	Security: Limited
Subject:	CCO Survey (Part 2)	Date Received: 03/19/93

59. MWR issues and procedures.[]

60. Civil Engineering issues and procedures.[]

61. Maintenance issues and procedures.[]

62. Operations issues and procedures.[]

Category - Setting Up Shop

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Strongly Somewhat Neither Disagree Somewhat Strongly
Disagree Disagree or Agree Agree Agree

63. Finding a place to work.[]

64. Proximity to critical organizations.[]

65. Anticipating customer requirements.[]

To:	TSgt Joe Contracting	WARRIOR AFB
From:	Capt Jon B. Tigges	Security: Limited
Subject:	CCO Survey (Part 2)	Date Received: 03/19/93

65. Anticipating customer requirements.[]

66. Chain of command in a contingency.[]

67. Establishing review and approval procedures.[]

68. Communication lines (i.e. fax, phone, radio, messages).[]

69. Obtaining a vehicle.[]

70. Security issues.[]

71. Obtaining interpreters.[]

Category - Locating Sources

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Strongly Somewhat Neither Disagree Somewhat Strongly
Disagree Disagree or Agree Agree Agree

To:	TSgt Joe Contracting	WARRIOR AFB
From:	Capt Jon B. Tigges	Security: Limited
Subject:	CCO Survey (Part 2)	Date Received: 03/19/93

72. Existing vendor source listings.[]

73. Using brokers.[]

74. Chambers of commerce.[]

75. Stateside purchasing networks.[]

76. Intermediate base support.[]

77. Home base support.[]

78. Referrals to other in-theater organizations.[]

Category - Transportation of Goods

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly	Somewhat	Neither Disagree	Somewhat	Strongly
Disagree	Disagree	or Agree	Agree	Agree

To:	TSgt Joe Contracting	WARRIOR AFB
From:	Capt Jon B. Tigges	Security: Limited
Subject:	CCO Survey (Part 2)	Date Received: 03/19/93

Disagree Disagree or Agree Agree Agree

79. Organic airlift.[]

80. Scheduled airlift.[]

81. Express shipping.[]

82. Sea shipping.[]

83. Methods of tracking shipments.[]

84. Customs issues.[]

Category - Money Matters

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

Strongly	Somewhat	Neither Disagree	Somewhat	Strongly
Disagree	Disagree	or Agree	Agree	Agree

To:	TSgt Joe Contracting	WARRIOR AFB
From:	Capt Jon B. Tigges	Security: Limited
Subject:	CCO Survey (Part 2)	Date Received: 03/19/93

Disagree Disagree or Agree Agree Agree

85. Appropriation sources.[]

86. Imprest funds.[]

87. Obligation authority (AF Form 616).[]

88. Duties of a contracting officer as a paying agent.[]

89. Protection of funds under field conditions.[]

90. Cash payments.[]

91. Converting funds.[]

Category - Decentralization of Contracting Authority

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
 From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
 Subject: CCO Survey (Part 2) Date Received: 03/19/93

92. Legal limitations of decentralization.[]
 93. Appropriate organizations.[]
 94. Methods of control.[]

Category - Types of Contingency Contracting

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Somewhat Neither Disagree Somewhat Strongly
 Disagree Disagree or Agree Agree Agree

95. Commodities.[]
 96. Construction.[]
 97. Services.[]

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
 From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
 Subject: CCO Survey (Part 2) Date Received: 03/19/93

Category - Contracting Instruments

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Somewhat Neither Disagree Somewhat Strongly
 Disagree Disagree or Agree Agree Agree

98. Use of SF 44s.[]
 99. Use of blanket purchase agreements.[]
 100. Use of 1155s.[]
 101. Use of credit cards.[]
 102. Use of letter contracts.[]
 103. Verbal contracts.[]

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
 From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
 Subject: CCO Survey (Part 2) Date Received: 03/19/93

103. Verbal contracts.[]
 104. Writing statements of work.[]

Category - Contract Administration

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Somewhat Neither Disagree Somewhat Strongly
 Disagree Disagree or Agree Agree Agree

105. Filing systems.[]
 106. Contract surveillance.[]
 107. Modifications.[]
 108. Payments.[]
 109. Terminations for default.[]

To:	TSgt Joe Contracting	WARRIOR AFB
From:	Capt Jon B. Tigges	Security: Limited
Subject:	CCO Survey (Part 2)	Date Received: 03/19/93

109. Terminations for default.[]

110. Ratifications.[]

111. Manual record keeping methods.[]

Category - Redeployment

1-----	2-----	3-----	4-----	5-----
Strongly	Somewhat	Neither Disagree	Somewhat	Strongly
Disagree	Disagree	or Agree	Agree	Agree

112. Terminations for convenience.[]

113. Claims.[]

114. Records disposition.[]

To:	TSgt Joe Contracting	WARRIOR AFB
From:	Capt Jon B. Tigges	Security: Limited
Subject:	CCO Survey (Part 2)	Date Received: 03/19/93

Category - Case Studies of Real-World Scenarios

115. Product alternatives.[]

116. Changing locations.[]

117. Limited manpower.[]

118. Restrictive commanders.[]

119. Interservice hostility.[]

120. Dealing with kickbacks.[]

- RANK ORDER -

Please rank order the effectiveness of the four methods of contingency contracting training listed below from 1 to 4 (1 being the most effective

To:	TSgt Joe Contracting	WARRIOR AFB
From:	Capt Jon B. Tigges	Security: Limited
Subject:	CCO Survey (Part 2)	Date Received: 03/19/93

contracting training listed below from 1 to 4 (1 being the most effective method, 4 being the least effective method).

121. Formal Academic Courses.[]

122. On-the-Job Training Program.[]

123. Base Exercises.[]

124. Deployment Exercises.[]

Please rank order the importance of having the four contingency contracting tools listed below (1 being most important, 4 being least important).

125. Fax machine.[]

126. Laptop computer.[]

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 2) Date Received: 03/19/93

126. Laptop computer. []
127. Portable copier. []
129. Cellular phone. []

Congratulations! You've just completed the Part 2 of this survey.
Please hit the F1 key now to send us your results. Then go to your next
message titled "CCO Survey (Part 3)" to complete the survey.

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 3) Date Received: 03/19/93

O.K., you've reached the third and final section of this survey. This section
gives you the opportunity to give specific inputs on issues we didn't cover
of that you want to tell us more about.

DIRECTIONS FOR ANSWERING QUESTIONS:

1. Hit the (shift) F1 key to edit this message.
2. Type "JON TIGGES" in the "To:" address block above.
3. Type in your response in the space following each question below.

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 3) Date Received: 03/19/93

4. If you need more space than that given, hit the F6 key to add as many
additional lines as you need.

- CHANGES IN TRAINING SINCE YOUR RETURN HOME -

129. List any relevant training initiatives your base or command has
implemented since your return from Desert Storm/Shield that you feel are
beneficial to contingency contracting officers.

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 3) Date Received: 03/19/93

- WAR STORIES -

130. Describe your most unique contracting challenge from your Desert Shield/Storm experience and how you dealt with it (generic versions of

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 3) Date Received: 03/19/93

Shield/Storm experience and how you dealt with it (generic versions of your story may be used in future training).

- CONTRACTOR FAILURE TO PERFORM -

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 3) Date Received: 03/19/93

131. Did any of your contractors refuse to work as a direct result of hostilities breaking out? If so, how did you deal with the situation?

- EFFECTIVENESS OF SIMULATIONS -

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 3) Date Received: 03/19/93

132. If you participated in base exercises or deployments before Desert Shield, describe your feelings regarding the statement, "We trained like we fought."

- YOUR IDEAS ON TRAINING SCENARIOS -

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 3) Date Received: 03/19/93

- YOUR IDEAS ON TRAINING SCENARIOS -

153. Describe a scenario you feel would be useful for training CCOs during a base exercise or deployment.

- YOUR IDEAS -

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 3) Date Received: 03/19/93

- YOUR IDEAS -

134. List any further initiatives or ideas you feel would be beneficial for training contingency contracting officers in the future.

.....

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 3) Date Received: 03/19/93

This completes the survey. Please hit F1 now to send your result to us (make
sure the name "JON TIGGES" is in the "To:" address block).

We appreciate the time you took to answer this survey. We can assure you
that your responses will make a difference in future contingency contracting
training efforts. Thanks!

Sincerely,

Capt Jon Tigges and Capt Tom Snyder

To: TSgt Joe Contracting WARRIOR AFB
From: Capt Jon B. Tigges Security: Limited
Subject: CCO Survey (Part 3) Date Received: 03/19/93

If you want to contact us, our mailing address is:

Capt Jon Tigges and Capt Tom Snyder

AFIT

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

AFIT/LAA

2950 P. ST

WPAFB, OH 45433-7768

Appendix B: Matrix of Survey Questions Related to IQs

Table B-1

Matrix of Survey Questions Related to IQs

IQ	Survey Questions
1	9, 10, 11, 12
2	13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
3	18, 19, 21
4	18, 19, 21
5	22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 132
6	22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 132
7	31, 32, 33
8	34, 35
9	36 through 120
10	121, 122, 123, 124
11	125, 126, 127, 128
12	129
13	130, 133
14	134

Appendix C: Survey Question Statistics

Survey Question 1: Your Rank is:

Table C-1

Responses to Question 1

	E1-E4	E5-E6	E7-E9	O1-O3	O4+	Civ
Number	2	19	15	4	2	0
Percent	75%	45%	36%	10%	5%	0




Figure C-1. Rank of Respondents at Time of Deployment

Survey Question 2: Total Years of Experience in contracting at the time of your deployment was:

Table C-2

Responses to Question 2

	1 year or less	1-2 years	3-4 years	5-6 years	7-8 years	9-10 years	10+ years
Number	2	2	5	10	6	3	14
Percent	5%	5%	12%	23%	14%	7%	33%




Figure C-2. Experience of Respondents at Time of Deployment

Survey Question 3: Your Sex is:

Table C-3

Responses to Question 3

	Male	Female
Number	40	2
Percent	95%	5%




Figure C-3. Gender of Respondents

Survey Question 4: Your Total time spent in the Area of Operations during Desert Shield/Storm was:

Table C-4

Responses to Question 4

	Less than 1 month	1-2 months	3-4 months	5-6 months	7-8 months	More than 8 months
Number	1	4	9	11	14	2
Percent	2%	10%	22%	26%	34%	5%




Figure C-4. Number of Months Spent in AOR

Survey Question 5: You were deployed to the AOR during:

Table C-5

Responses to Question 5

	Desert Shield	Desert Storm	Desert Calm	Desert Shield and Storm	Desert Storm and Calm	All three Phases
Number	6	2	3	16	1	14
Percent	15%	5%	7%	38%	2%	33%




Figure C-5. Phase of Operation in Which Respondents Participated

Survey Question 6: Your wing commander at your deployed location was the same commander you worked under at your home base before deploying:

Table C-6

Responses to Question 6

	Yes	No
Number	14	28
Percent	33%	66%




Figure C-6. Respondents Association with Wing Commander

Survey Question 7: Before Desert Shield, did you hold a contingency contracting mobility position number:

Table C-7

Responses to Question 7

	Yes	No
Number	23	19
Percent	54%	45%




Figure C-7. Respondents that Held Mobility Position Numbers

Survey Question 8: During your deployment, which of the following best describes your working location:

Table C-8

Responses to Question 8

	CENTCOM	CENTAF	Provisional Wing	Other
Number	1	5	33	1
Percent	3%	12%	82%	2%




Figure C-8. Working Location of Respondents

Survey Question 9: Before deploying, how many formal academic courses did you attend that included training on contingency contracting.

a. None b. One c. Two d. Three e. More than three

Table C-9
Responses to Question 9

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
1.21	.72	1




Figure C-9. Number of Formal Courses Respondents Attended that Included Contingency Contracting

Survey Question 10: Before deploying to the AOR, how many base exercises did you participate in which you practiced contingency contracting?

a. None b. One c. Two d. Three e. More than three

Table C-10

Responses to Question 10

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
2.26	1.82	1




Figure C-10. Number of Base Exercises Respondents Participated in that Practiced Contingency Contracting

Survey Question 11: Before deploying to the AOR, how many deployment exercises did you participate in as a contingency contracting officer?

a. None b. One c. Two d. Three e. More than three

Table C-11
Responses to Question 11

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
2.24	1.80	1




Figure C-11. Number of Deployment Exercises Respondents Participated in that Practiced Contingency Contracting

Survey Question 12: Before deploying to the AOR, how many deployments did you participate in that were not exercises (i.e. Grenada, Operation Just Cause)?

a. None b. One c. Two d. Three e. More than three

Table C-12

Responses to Question 12

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
1.36	1.03	1




Figure C-12. Number of Real World Deployments Respondents Participated in Before ODS.

Survey Question 13. How would you describe the coverage of contingency contracting in formal academic courses you took prior to Desert Shield?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Excellent Good Fair Poor Non-Existent

Table C-13

Responses to Question 13

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
4.74	.63	5




Figure C-13. Quality of Coverage of Contingency Contracting in Formal Courses

Survey Question 14: How would you describe your knowledge of contingency contracting regulations such as AFR 70-7 prior to Desert Shield/Storm?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Excellent Good Fair Poor Non-Existent

Table C-14

Responses to Question 14

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
2.79	1.16	3




Figure C-14. Respondents' Quality of Knowledge of Regulations.

Survey Question 15: How would you describe your training in contingency contracting from the OJT program at your base prior to Desert Shield/Storm?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Excellent Good Fair Poor Non-Existent

Table C-15

Responses to Question 15

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
3.81	1.27	4




Figure C-15. Quality of CCO Training from Base OJT

Survey Question 16: How would you describe the training you received in contingency contracting from your involvement in base exercises?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Excellent Good Fair Poor Non-Existent

Table C-16

Responses to Question 16

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
3.93	1.37	5




Figure C-16. Quality of CCO Training Received from Base Exercises

Survey Question 17: How would you describe the training you received from performing contingency contracting during a deployment exercise?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Excellent Good Fair Poor Non-Existent

Table C-17

Responses to Question 17

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
3.95	1.48	5




Figure C-17. Quality of CCO Training Received from Deployment Exercises

Survey Question 18: Formal academic courses prepared me for contingency contracting duties during Desert Shield/Storm.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neither Disagree or Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

Table C-18

Responses to Question 18

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
1.83	1.18	1




Figure C-18. Preparation Received from Formal Courses

Survey Question 19: Contingency contracting officers should receive more training from formal academic courses to help them prepare for wartime contingencies.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neither Disagree or Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

Table C-19
 Responses to Question 19

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
4.37	1.09	1




Figure C-19. Respondents' Views on More Formal Course Training

Survey Question 20: When contingency contracting is taught in a formal academic course, it should be taught as a separate course and NOT as a part of another course.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neither Disagree or Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

Table C-20
 Responses to Question 20

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
3.95	1.38	4




Figure C-20. Contingency Contracting as a Separate Course

Survey Question 21: Additional formal academic training on contingency contracting is NOT really worthwhile.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neither Disagree or Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

Table C-21
 Responses to Question 21

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
1.64	1.08	1




Figure C-21. Worthiness of Additional Formal Course Training

Survey Question 22: More contingency contracting training during base exercises would NOT have improved my proficiency during Desert Shield/Storm.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neither Disagree or Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

Table C-22

Responses to Question 22

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
2.64	1.51	3




Figure C-22. Base Exercise Contribution to Proficiency

Survey Question 23: I wish I had more contingency contracting training from base exercises before deploying to the AOR.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neither Disagree or Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

Table C-23

Responses to Question 23

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
3.36	1.56	4




Figure C-23. Desire for More Base Exercise Training

Survey Question 24: The contingency contracting training I received during base exercises prepared me for the requirements of Desert Shield/Storm.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neither Disagree or Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

Table C-24
 Responses to Question 24

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
1.88	1.27	1




Figure C-24. Base Exercise Preparation for ODS

Survey Question 25: The contingency contracting training I recieved during deployment exercises prepared me for the requirements of Desert Shield/Storm.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neither Disagree or Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

Table C-25

Responses to Question 25

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
2.29	1.27	3




Figure C-25. Deployment Exercise Preparation for ODS

Survey Question 26: More contingency contracting training during deployment exercises would NOT have improved my proficiency during Desert Shield/Storm.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neither Disagree or Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

Table C-26

Responses to Question 26

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
2.41	1.34	2




Figure C-26. Deployment Exercise Contribution to Proficiency

Survey question 27: I wish I had more contingency contracting training from deployments before deploying to Desert Shield/Storm.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neither Disagree or Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

Table C-27
 Responses to Question 27

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
3.88	1.27	4




Figure C-27. Desire for More Training from Deployments

Survey Question 28: More OJT would NOT have improved my proficiency during Desert Shield/Storm.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neither Disagree or Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

Table C-28
 Responses to Question 28

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
2.55	1.38	3




Figure C-28. OJT Contribution to Proficiency

Survey Question 29: I wish I had recieved more contingency contracting OJT before deploying to the AOR.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neither Disagree or Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

Table C-29
 Responses to Question 29

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
3.71	1.20	4




Figure C-29. Desire for More OJT Training Before ODS

Survey Question 30: My home base OJT program prepared me for the requirements of Desert Shield/Storm.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neither Disagree or Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

Table C-30

Responses to Question 30

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
2.54	1.52	3




Figure C-30. OJT Preparation for ODS

Survey Question 31: I had problems getting support from my deployed wing commander.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neither Disagree or Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

Table C-31
 Responses to Question 31

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
2.00	1.41	1




Figure C-31. Wing Commander Support

Survey Question 32: When I arrived in the AOR, my deployed wing commander understood contracting capabilities and limitations.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neither Disagree or Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

Table C-32
 Responses to Question 32

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
3.05	1.48	4




Figure C-32. Deployed Commander Comprehension

Survey Question 33: As time passed, my deployed wing commander gained an understanding of contracting capabilities and limitations.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neither Disagree or Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

Table C-33
Responses to Question 33

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
3.68	1.29	4




Figure C-33. Deployed Commander Increase in Comprehension

Survey Question 34: My current Logistics Group Commander understands contingency contracting capabilities and limitations.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neither Disagree or Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

Table C-34
 Responses to Question 34

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
3.49	.93	3




Figure C-34. Current Logistics Commander Comprehension

Survey Question 35: My current wing commander understands contingency contracting capabilities and limitations.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neither Disagree or Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

Table C-35
 Responses to Question 35

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
3.32	.91	3




Figure C-35. Current Wing Commander Comprehension

T-TEST ANALYSIS OF TOPICS

Question	Mean	Std Dev	Vanance	T-Stat	99%test	99%test
97	4.8510638297872	0.41591823006218	0.17298797409806	12.446723418914	2.326	REJECT
68	4.7659574468085	0.47606932074002	0.22564199814986	9.7866782295044	2.326	REJECT
98	4.7234042553192	0.71329387990641	0.50878815311193	6.1689808678511	2.326	REJECT
48	4.7021276595745	0.50711861304489	0.25716928769658	8.4218478854338	2.326	REJECT
99	4.6808510638298	0.66287853758941	0.43940795559667	6.2476835569333	2.326	REJECT
44	4.6808510638298	0.51526198396389	0.26549491211841	8.0375720865614	2.326	REJECT
95	4.6808510638298	0.66287853758941	0.43940795559667	6.2476835569333	2.326	REJECT
69	4.6595744680851	0.73785884149165	0.62072155411656	5.0923270120531	2.326	REJECT
58	4.6382978723404	0.5285553428328	0.27937095282146	7.3457075539206	2.326	REJECT
41	4.6382978723404	0.60524992735282	0.36632747456059	6.4148944186288	2.326	REJECT
90	4.6170212765957	0.76762871397269	0.58926919518964	4.889271258957	2.326	REJECT
120	4.6170212765957	0.79545424510729	0.6327474560592	4.7183026862634	2.326	REJECT
49	4.6170212765957	0.49136860729306	0.24144310823312	7.6382451908435	2.326	REJECT
55	4.5957446808511	0.57708316287453	0.33302497687327	6.2794648245795	2.326	REJECT
84	4.5744680851084	0.65090842376882	0.42368177613321	5.3684248277712	2.326	REJECT
43	4.5744680851064	0.8273761788634	0.6845513413506	4.2234149737865	2.326	REJECT
70	4.5531914893617	0.65303674037057	0.42645698427392	5.1527460177735	2.326	REJECT
89	4.5531914893617	0.74625181197939	0.55689176688252	4.5091112803854	2.326	REJECT
56	4.531914893617	0.74749040505074	0.55874190564292	4.3284996866587	2.326	REJECT
113	4.531914893617	0.85595265588769	0.73265494912118	3.7800127866735	2.326	REJECT
54	4.531914893617	0.68686635083093	0.47178538390379	4.7105408208285	2.326	REJECT
60	4.5106382978723	0.68753941944008	0.472710453284	4.5176922489557	2.326	REJECT
38	4.4893617021277	0.85649285957408	0.73358001850139	3.4754183786184	2.326	REJECT
46	4.4893617021277	0.68753941944008	0.472710453284	4.3294550699992	2.326	REJECT
71	4.4893617021277	0.74810893259146	0.55986697502313	3.9789272599753	2.326	REJECT
65	4.468085106383	0.85595265588769	0.73265494912118	3.3264112522726	2.326	REJECT
66	4.468085106383	0.71781867123484	0.51526364477338	3.9665317440955	2.326	REJECT
91	4.468085106383	0.8301666629368	0.68917668825162	3.4297336584018	2.326	REJECT
94	4.468085106383	0.68686635083093	0.47178538390379	4.145275922329	2.326	REJECT
112	4.4468085106383	0.879933560691	0.77428307123034	3.0886764501418	2.326	REJECT
83	4.4468085106383	0.74625181197939	0.55689176688252	3.6419744956959	2.326	REJECT
57	4.4468085106383	0.879933560691	0.77428307123034	3.0886764501418	2.326	REJECT
72	4.4255319148936	0.77304257296185	0.59759481961147	3.3483402826274	2.326	REJECT
53	4.4255319148936	0.65090842376882	0.42366177813321	3.9766109835342	2.326	REJECT
108	4.4255319148936	0.74439005819658	0.55411655874191	3.4772221347299	2.326	REJECT
47	4.4255319148936	0.65090842376882	0.42366177813321	3.9766109835342	2.326	REJECT
78	4.4042553191489	0.74190045236615	0.55041628122109	3.3144461632688	2.326	REJECT
87	4.4042553191489	0.90071407585231	0.81128584643848	2.7300440548189	2.326	REJECT
104	4.3953488372093	0.82055541247322	0.67331118493909	2.9307138271229	2.326	REJECT

77	4.3829787234043	0.79545424510729	0.6327474560592	2.9286016673359	2.326	REJECT
52	4.3829787234043	0.73877664711337	0.54579093432007	3.153278650067	2.326	REJECT
118	4.3695652173913	0.95122600777859	0.9048309178744	2.3632422141073	2.326	REJECT
87	4.3617021276596	0.91901487698829	0.84458834412581	2.3940288718275	2.326	REJECT
37	4.3617021276596	0.96516571937929	0.93154486586494	2.2795548007692	2.326	FTR
114	4.3617021276596	0.79195772600435	0.62719703977798	2.7781131200643	2.326	REJECT
92	4.3617021276596	0.70481363293376	0.49676225716929	3.1216027136009	2.326	REJECT
64	4.3404255319149	0.70020480683002	0.49028677150786	2.957171300578	2.326	REJECT
42	4.3404255319149	0.93893083841686	0.88159111933395	2.2054102230515	2.326	FTR
88	4.3404255319149	1.1087908758149	1.2294172062905	1.8675547526176	2.326	FTR
85	4.3404255319149	0.81498454892478	0.66419981498612	2.5408183167634	2.326	REJECT
106	4.3404255319149	0.66843736478319	0.4468085106383	3.0978634332611	2.326	REJECT
111	4.3191489361702	0.91143420136789	0.83071230342276	2.1299477104463	2.326	FTR
109	4.3191489361702	0.75487928717469	0.56984273820537	2.5716789735897	2.326	REJECT
76	4.2978723404255	0.74934445603043	0.56151711378353	2.4175623889688	2.326	REJECT
36	4.2765957446809	0.8262573464667	0.68270120259019	2.0362496489705	2.326	FTR
107	4.2765957446809	0.79951419106894	0.63922294172063	2.104360686147	2.326	FTR
96	4.2553191489362	0.96612370047802	0.93339500462535	1.6075019705779	2.326	FTR
50	4.2340425531915	0.66635823886082	0.44403330249769	2.1364263093865	2.326	FTR
110	4.2127659574468	1.0412402765925	1.0841813135985	1.2429453822631	2.326	FTR
100	4.1914893617021	1.1541663257491	1.3320999074931	1.0091997039503	2.326	FTR
62	4.1702127659574	0.7609818867801	0.5790934320074	1.3605630473998	2.326	FTR
101	4.1702127659574	1.1481393063518	1.31822386679	0.90177544585898	2.326	FTR
61	4.1702127659574	0.7609818867801	0.5790934320074	1.3605630473998	2.326	FTR
59	4.1489361702128	0.88412873851717	0.78168362627197	1.0246735753114	2.326	FTR
81	4.1489361702128	0.85918878333135	0.70820536540241	1.0544171119405	2.326	FTR
116	4.1204347826087	0.90942462034883	0.82705314009662	0.87242393762832	2.326	FTR
39	4.1276595744681	0.89968644964681	0.80943570767808	0.86310389188929	2.326	FTR
117	4.1086956521739	0.92444003157624	0.85458937198068	0.71521117393634	2.326	FTR
119	4.1086956521739	1.0376953282168	1.0768115942029	0.63715217968032	2.326	FTR
93	4.1063829787234	0.81384868140565	0.66234967622572	0.79511389720612	2.326	FTR
75	4.1063829787234	1.0474408264534	1.0971322849214	0.61779375069767	2.326	FTR
80	4.1063829787234	0.91447401259083	0.83626271970398	0.70762251075367	2.326	FTR
105	4.1063829787234	0.93794508398602	0.87974098057354	0.68991501512913	2.326	FTR
86	4.0851063829787	0.92852822377657	0.66216466234968	0.55752954427304	2.326	FTR
40	4.0851063829787	0.82960931701097	0.68825161887142	0.62400687508185	2.326	FTR
51	4.0425531914894	0.75057794568182	0.56326725254394	0.34485553460844	2.326	FTR
83	4.0212765957447	0.96660233498887	0.93432007400555	0.13389216503728	2.326	FTR
45	3.9148936170213	0.7754322002163	0.60129509713229	-0.66760435961058	2.326	FTR
115	3.9130434782609	0.98491030514395	0.97004830917874	-0.53703963641299	2.326	FTR
79	3.8297872340426	0.93991555902345	0.88344125809436	-1.101549841317	2.326	FTR
82	3.6808510638298	1.0447879539123	1.0915818688401	-1.8580872636943	2.326	FTR
73	3.6170212765957	1.3601980592572	1.850138760407	-1.7126686901633	2.326	FTR
102	3.5957446808511	1.424316380158	2.0286771507863	-1.7264346195328	2.326	FTR
74	3.4893517021277	1.1204102592069	1.2553191489362	-2.77228049204	2.326	FTR
103	3.4042553191489	1.6766889533955	2.8112858464385	-2.1612675474417	2.326	FTR

Survey Questions 36 through 120: Using the scale provided, pick the number that best reflects your agreement or disagreement with the following statement: CCO training for a Desert Shield/Storm scenario should include more on. . .

Table C-36

Rank Order of Training Topics From T-Test

TOPIC	CATEGORY	DESCRIPTION
1. Services.	Types of contingency contracting	How to create and modify service contracts for short term contingencies
2. Communication lines (i.e. fax, phone, radio, messages).	Setting up Shop	What communication is needed immediately and how to get it
3. Use of SF 44s.	Contracting Instruments	How to most effectively use these forms and what dollar limits apply
4. Currency issues.	Country Unique Issues	Exchange rates, normal payment procedures for business, bank assistance
5. Use of blanket purchase agreements.	Contracting Instruments	How to set up and use efficiently (i.e. faxing price lists and quotes
6. Host nation support agreements.	Country Unique Issues	What are they, how to establish them.
7. Commodities.	Types of Contingency Contracting	Rules and dollar threshold changes to normal practices
8. Obtaining a vehicle.	Setting up Shop	Where to look, what type is necessary
9. Finance issues and procedures.	Coordination	Procedures for carrying cash, signing receipts etc
10. Procurement integrity in a contingency.	Planning and Preparation	How to deal with bribes, kickbacks, and other questionable situations
11. Cash payments.	Money Matters	Paying vendors with cash

Table C-36 Continued

12. Dealing with kickbacks (case study).	Case Studies of Real World Scenarios	Examples of unethical business practices and how they were handled
13. Makeup of local economy.	Country Unique Issues	Is econcmly, service, manufacturing, What rules are he transportation squadrons working under?
Transportation issues and procedures.	Coordination	Rules and regulations the transportation squadrons are operating under
15. Customs issues.	Transportation of Goods	What clearances are needed to move items?
16. How to establish a pre-deployment listing of critical requirements.	Planning and Preparation	Using personal expertise to create lists of items needed for <u>other</u> organizations upon arrival
17. Security issues.	Setting up Shop	Problems in a high threat, closed base environment
18. Protection of funds under field conditions.	Money Matters	What rules apply and who is responsible
19. Supply issues and procedures.	Coordination	What rules are the supply squadrons operating under
20. Claims.	Redeployment	How to handle claims before leaving the AOR
21. Mutual support agreements with other nations.	Coordination	Working with agreements from nations not participating in the operation
22. Civil Engineering issues and procedures.	Coordination	Rules the Civil Engineering Squadron is operating under
23. Understanding legal authority under emergency conditions.	Planning and Preparation	What laws change in emergencies and who declares the emergency

Table C-36 Continued

24. Cultural issues (i.e. taboos, customs).	Country Unique Issues	Local taboos and customs, how to conduct business
25. Obtaining interpreters.	Setting up Shop	Are they necessary, & where to find them
26. Anticipating customer requirements.	Setting up Shop	Looking around the base and asking questions about what others need
27. Chain of command in a contingency.	Setting up Shop	Streamlined lines of authority
28. Converting funds.	Money Matters	Are exchange rates fixed or do they fluctuate
29. Methods of control.	Decentralizing Contracting Authority	How to monitor decentralized authority
30. Terminations for convenience.	Redeployment	How to process when its time to leave
31. Finding a place to work.	Setting up Shop	Where to establish the contracting office
32. Services issues and procedures.	Coordination	Rules the Services Squadrons are working under
33. Existing vendor source listings.	Locating Sources	Local listings (phone books, chamber of commerce
34. Working with the other branches of the U.S. armed forces.	Coordination	How other departments conduct contracting and how to aide each other
35. Payments.	Contract Administration	Paying with cash, check, or monthly billing, and what currency?
36. Dress issues.	Country Unique Issues	Looking as inconspicuous as possible
37. Referrals to other in-theater organizations.	Locating Sources	Getting other bases to buy for you at lower cost

Table C-36 Continued

38. Obligation authority (AF Form 616).	Money Matters	How to set up and track expenditure of funds
39. Writing statements of work.	Contracting Instruments	Standard formats, how long or complex should they be
40. Home base support.	Locating Sources	Using home base to buy goods and ship to you
41. Working with the U.S. Embassy.	Coordination	What services can the U.S. Embassy provide and who to contact
42. Restrictive commanders (case study).	Case Studies of Real World Scenarios	Examples of problems CCO had with restrictive commanders
43. Establishing review and approval procedures.	Setting up Shop	What level should sign a request before contracting accepts it
44. Records disposition.	Redeployment	How to close out and where to send records
45. Legal limitations of decentralization.	Decentralizing Contracting Authority	Dollar thresholds for decentralizing contracting authority
46. Proximity to critical organizations.	Setting up Shop	What organizations should contracting be close to on the base
47. Appropriation sources.	Money Matters	How many sources are there for funds?
48. Contract surveillance.	Contract Administration	How to conduct, what rules apply
49. Terminations for default.	Contract Administration	Applicability of U.S. laws in a foreign country
50. Intermediate base support.	Locating Sources	Using a base as a <u>middle man</u> back to the U.S.

Appendix D: Responses to Open-Ended Survey Questions

This appendix is comprised of responses to survey questions 129 - 135. The original questions are stated first followed by sanitized versions of each response categorized by general themes.

- CHANGES IN TRAINING SINCE YOUR RETURN HOME -

129. List any relevant training initiatives your base or command has implemented since your return from Desert Storm/Shield that you feel are beneficial to contingency contracting officers.

NO NEW INITIATIVES SINCE ODS

1. None.
2. None. Although getting inputs from CCOs like this one could be a teaching tool for future deployments.
3. NONE!
4. Zip, Nada!

5. We have not implemented any new training programs due to X's impending base closure. Our mobility taskings went away in Apr 92--we haven't been tasked since.

6. Having recently returned from a AMC conference, contingency contracting was discussed briefly. Recommend command superintendents obtain feedback from their CCOs and send out crosstells. There does not appear to be any training at HQ level. If we're going to get smart, lets not just talk the talk, but walk the walk.

7. I PCSd from Langley within seven months of returning home, at the time I left there had not been changes. Langley had many, many exercises, however we participated by quality control of load planners, not on contracting matters!

8. Nothing has been implemented since Desert Storm, however, prior to the deployment the RM placed CCOs on the Battle Staff during exercises. Unfortunately, the training was more "eye wash" than anything, but it made the commanders aware of our existence and above all our importance to them. Since our return we are no longer in the Battle Staff, but operate out of our office. Again, not very realistic training. Primarily because we don't have real customers. Typically Command Post or LG provides our

requirements. This, I suppose is realistic during the initial phase of a contingency.

9. NONE.

10. No new training initiatives have been established since my return or since the return of any other contingency contracting officers at Travis AFB. Little emphasis has been placed on CCO's responsibilities, you have to be able to fly by the seat of your pants when you deploy.

11. None as of this survey.

12. None.

13. None.

14. NONE.

15. None.

16. I haven't noticed any training geared toward contingency contracting at my last duty station. Since my deployment, I have PCS'd and I am not a contingency contracting officer here at RAF Lakenheath.

17. NONE.

18. NONE.

19. I am not aware of any initiatives by the Air Force to better prepare CCOs for deployment!

20. NONE.

21. I am now in a different command than I was when deployed (AMC in lieu of USAFE). However, I feel fairly confident that both commands have yet to put together a serious training program for CCOs. However, I do know that AMC is putting together a guide to assist our CCOs when deployed.

22. Although discussions have been held regarding the need for establishing a training program, to date, none have been realized.

NEW INITIATIVES SINCE ODS

23. IMPAC card. Other than that, not a damn thing!

24. Each of the CCO's deployed have come back and briefed the other CCO's of the experiences that happened to them while being deployed. This has given us insight to what to expect in case one of us is deployed to that location.

25. Contingency Contracting Officers held several training sessions for those that have not been there. Also, read several "lessons learned" reports.

26. We have gotten all of our seven levels trained in the CCO arena, in lieu of the required two. This gives us flexibility in the event the primary and alternate are unavailable.

27. Initiatives we have implemented are to include our five-levels in the quarterly contingency training.

28. We have implemented more training on CCO requirements, supplemented by lesson learned by the two persons in the office who had recently deployed.

29. To date, none have been implemented at the base. ACC has revised 70-7 to include more of what a CCO will need to operate effectively. The addition of a laptop computer and a cellular phone will go a long way. I experience problems with O/S vendors not believing I was allowed to act on behalf of the

US Govt. Some asked for some picture ID proving I was who I said I was and not some sorry GI.

30. Some pamphlets from the Logistics Management Center, but they deal mostly with Southwest Asia. The best training I think I've seen came from SMSgt (CMSgt Select) Mike Davis (HQ ACC) while he was assigned to USCENTAF. He wrote a very basic, logical article in a TAC/LGC newsletter about what to do as a CCO, especially emphasizing getting yourself set up. If you don't have a copy, give me a call and I'll get you one. Again, it was excellent!

31. Slowly developing local training scenarios for base level exercises.

32. As the author of the "wartime contingency contracting handbook" in 1986 your Part 2 survey looks awfully familiar!! As you probably know, we got AFLMA to update this handbook with our lessons learned from ODS. Also, we had AFLMA publish the "USCENTAF Operational contracting Guide" under project LC922137 that answers many of the questions raised in Parts 2 & 3 so I won't repeat them here. In addition you may want to get a copy of the USCENTAF Desert Shield/Storm briefing that included war stories, lessons learned, and pictures I took while I was in the AOR. (Tom Snyder is in at least 1 pic!). CENTAF/LGC can be reached at DSN 965-2021. Obviously, I'm very interested in your product since I've dealt with it a long time.

33. Developed formal training course for command CCOs.

34. I am a member of the wing inspection team and we now play a vital part in the wing's OREs.

35. During base exercises, if we aren't too heavily tasked with Mobility, we set up a contingency contracting office at the FOL. We man it in shifts and give the people a chance to feel what its like setting up shop and trying to get going. Because of manning we've only been able to do this once so far but it was really great. Currently planning our second effort at this type of training.

36. Training geared toward as if each student were in fact a CCO with decisions and determinations i.e.: Topics CO Decision (PNM), Type of Contracts, Sourcing (AFLMC Pamphlet) and minimal carrying of forms & documents.

37. At X AFB each exercise included a CCO who actually received demands, funded the documents, wrote BPAs or Contracts or PO's for items such as truck rentals, road repair, concrete delivery and so forth. Also did things like rent 10 cars and 10 1-1/2 ton trucks so when the IG blew up the vehicle we would simulate replacement by placing a sign in the window "RENTAL VEHICLE #XXX." This was helping the young troops get some idea of how

WE could help in wartime situations. The important thing is to make all play (i.e. finance, supply and contracting)!!

38. We have become the first base in ACC to fully integrate contracting into Phase II (at the deployed location and operating) exercises. It has been a tough job training other units on how to use us effectively, but we have finally gotten through. Training during several Phase II's and especially the use of BPAs and a laptop with the contingency contracting computer program proved valuable.

MISCELLANEOUS

39. Base X goes TDY all the time and have qualified CCOs and this office had a Contingency Contracting Flight.

40. Real world training. Preparing them for what to expect when they get off the plane. Join with finance officer and cash certified checks, get rental car, set up office, secure phone lines. If two CCO's deployed, one researches local community for sources and gets familiar with roads & buildings. The other CCO sets up office and stays in close contact with commander and organizes requirement for purchase. The CCO's work as a team to determine all the needs of the deployed unit. CCO's cannot be on a short leash to effectively perform there duties.

- WAR STORIES -

130. Describe your most unique contracting challenge from your Desert Shield/Storm experience and how you dealt with it (generic versions of your story may be used in future training).

CREATIVE SOLUTIONS

1. The most unique Contracting challenge was fitting the HUMVEE vehicles with steel plating. We found a contractor who manufactured and delivered the plating and the SPs installed them.
2. Needed forklift parts really bad, but transportation and supply didn't seem to be able to really help me. Had to coordinate nearly all of the organic airlift from the west coast to my deployed location. In this one order, I had to set up a "ship to" address, payment address and get people to agree to act in these capacities on our behalf, and to simply handle the cargo and to get it prioritized on organic airlift.
3. Shortly after arriving during Desert Shield I was tasked to locate and provide oversized deep spline sockets to mount pylons for additional wing tanks. This was the eve of operation Desert Storm and only two serviceable sockets were on the installation. A source was contacted by cellular phone

while enroute to the business district. The parts were in the technicians hands by 8 PM. The contractor was paid the following day as the Finance Paying Agent worked all night as a scheduled shift to provide for next day payments.

4. In the UEL inspection at X AFB the first item purchased was a color copier to allow pilots access to important maps. In Desert Shield the actual first requirement was for a color copier. This item was located and no competition could be located. The manufacturer in the states was contacted and with express shipping was \$2,000.00 higher, all competition requirements were met.

5. Sewage - A service contract was required to haul the waste generated by tent city which doesn't seem too complex until security, base access, the threat of terrorist bombings and the actual dumping entered the picture. It was a very complex requirement that took coordination with the local base, embassy, host country security and the local host (city) government.

6. The night before Desert Storm started there was some concern on the part of the pilots with not enough required items for the pilots survival kits and it was past closing time for all local stores. Luckily the base had established contact with the local chamber of commerce and a vendor willing to open for us to purchase these item was located.

7. Not only awarding contracts but also determining the needs of the deployed unit, writing SOW's, insuring services contracted for were being performed, picking up and delivering supplies.

8. Developing long term commitments were difficult because we had no idea how long we would be in the AOR. The way we dealt with it is through the use of BPAs. We advised each vendor that we may not be around tomorrow, but we could be here forever. For example, rental vehicles; five bidders gave competitive bids. We ended up with an annual lease with a one month penalty clause. We showed that after three months, even with a one month penalty the monthly price could not be beat. The subsequent months were of course prorated. Unfortunately, this particular vendor only had 80 vehicles. So we negotiated with the second low and agreed to a daily rate based on an annual rate divided by 365 days. It was a gamble for the vendor; 8 months later the vendor had done very well for himself. It was understood by each of our 84 BPAS holders that we were committed for what we ordered that day and anything else would be a tour request. The understanding must be up front and clearly understood by the vendor or a problem could come up. We probably had 5 BPAs that had an initial three month guaranteed business. The well over 300 vehicles, including 15 buses were returned at government convenience without a hitch.

9. What we called 10 percenters were a big problem at Dhaharan. We always had vendors coming in and telling us they could provide anything from a screw to an F-16. Finding manufacturer's were a big problem. Learning more about the area helped us to learn what could be made over there and what we had to get from other countries.

10. A tough contracting issue was cellular phones and getting accounts set up - even U.S. Embassy couldn't always help because they were maxed out on the number of units allowed. Used private company but usually bought phones.

11. I got there about two weeks into Desert Shield and there were not enough contracting folks to do the job correctly. It was a state of confusion and everyone was too busy to set up proper channels for distribution. To coin a phrase, we just made it happen.

12. Trying to locate a 2-1/2" Tap Thread Chaser in the AOR. Bomb loaders at KKMC broke theirs. These were used to clean out the threads on the bombs so that it was a lot easier to screw the bombs on the aircraft a lot easier. I didn't know what I was looking for or where to look for one. An individual from CENTAF who knew what we needed went out with me in the local market. After driving around several places we finally found what we were looking for, bought three of them, red tag airlifted up to KKMC, and had the product there in 1/2 day from request. Also, trying to locate magnesium film

tape for the Apache helicopter. The Army was running low on stock, located, bought, and air freighted the film to AOR.

13. The most unique challenge would be purchasing a DSN upgrade for Eskan Village at Riyadh AB. How can you justify price fair and reasonableness when there is only one source of supply when you're in the kingdom? I finally decided that it was because "I'm over here and you're not!!!" Besides, he had damn good tea at his office.

14. An F-16 unit ran out of item X a week before the war started and since they could not fly combat mission without item X for their X systems, it was necessary to find a company who could provide the correct type of item X and the large quantities needed. Had to go to a business who could get it and in the quantities required. Since Saudi Arabia did not use this type of item X, it had to be shipped in from out of country.

15. Well, one night on our way back from Zakho, Iraq the weather was so bad that the helicopters had to land in the middle of Kurdish village. Unable to speak the language I was able to find lodging and food for all 15 of us. I used my pocket size Kurdish dictionary to explain what we needed also one of the people stranded spoke a little Kurdish. It was some experience. The snow didn't stop until late the following day. Flexibility is a big factor in dealing with some of these countries.

16. Not only awarding contracts but also determining the needs of the deployed unit, writing SOW's, insuring services contracted for were being performed, picking up and delivering supplies.

17. My time at OPC coincided with changing border conditions between Turkey and the Security Zone in Iraq. Turks making deliveries into the Zone were actually making their money by bringing back cheap fuel (around \$.05 a liter). We quickly faced two problems. First, our contractors had trouble finding drivers to make the trip if they couldn't cash in on the lucrative fuel trade. And as this fuel trade always was illegal, we weren't eligible for more money from us. Then problem #2. The people living on the border who were making money on the fuel trade didn't like their livelihood cut off. Even though they, too, were Kurds, they "went on strike," blocking the road, dragging at least one driver out of his truck and threatening to kill any and everyone connected with the food deliveries if the relief effort continued. So food deliveries stopped for a few days. Our answer was to request assistance from our Turkish General Staff liaison; they provided armed escort for the final miles of the journey through the trouble areas all the way to the border. It is my understanding that this problem arose again later and was again resolved the same way. The above story tells part of the story. We had a contractor who assured us that he could deliver all quantities on time and needed no funding assistance. He only wanted his money at the end of the

contract. "No problem, hobie (Brother)" was his answer to every question. He had a problem with everything. He didn't have trucks, didn't have contracts for the food, didn't have funding and didn't have any idea of how to do the project. No, I didn't pick this contractor -- I inherited this one. We had to help the guy organize and made partial payments as he delivered and our people certified receipt.

PROBLEMS WITH COMMANDERS

18. Command pressure to circumvent FAR regulations was extreme even when hostilities had ceased. CCO did not have appropriate contingency guidance to deviate from some far regulatory guidance. The word "urgent" was not clearly defined and often misused. CENTAF forward contracting personnel were not respected because commanders always outranked them. Politics superseded professional contracting applications. Some specific guidance (far deviations) should be developed and indorsed by appropriate authority which will give CCO more flexibility while operating in wartime environment. Otherwise, creative inefficiency will continue.

19. Trying to perform my duties with a RM (LG) that was ignorant of CCO responsibilities, but wanting to micro-manage the contracting operation. The only way to operate was to disregard the RM and risk disciplinary action.

Eventually, involvement of CENTAF/LGC and CENTAF/LG was necessary to keep the RM from interfering with CCO operations.

20. My most unique experience was convincing the RM that all of my CCOs needed their own vehicle. Convinced that we had too many vehicles, the RM pulled one of three vehicles. The resulting slowdown in obtaining those goods and services resulting in the vehicle being returned.

21. The biggest problem during my deployment was the nonsupport of the BCO and LG Commander. They both tried to get things done that were just not possible by law. Fortunately this did not happen to my knowledge.

22. You can probably mention this to Lt Col Brad Busch and he'll know exactly who told you, but it was the day I had to drop everything I was doing to go purchase soccer uniforms for CENTCOM. I just found it strange that in the preparations for war, our most important concern at the time was soccer uniforms. And this was not Col Busch's fault for the urgency, it was way above his pay grade. It really put things in perspective for me!

23. Customers did not want to hear that items were not available. They thought they were back in the States and that all items were readily available.

24. There were many acts of "contracting heroism" turned in during ODS/DS, not only in my AOR, but also throughout the theater. So I won't bore you with another war story. However, I must admit that personally my biggest challenge was "winning over" those people I worked with (other DCSs) and some senior leadership. Luckily for me I had an outstanding wing commander who believed in me. To make a long story short, there were many who (after realizing just how important CCOs would be in that operation) thought an enlisted person (TSgt) and a minority (African-American) couldn't do the job. I feel proud to say I proved them wrong!

CULTURAL REALITIES

25. Getting the Saudis to buy and deliver items and services they agreed to support us with was like pulling teeth. It was even worse trying to get them to pay their bills. They were super slow.

26. My deployment was to a civilian airport to bed down a SAC refueling wing (provisional). The most unique requirement was the negotiation of pre-priced BPAs for miscellaneous aircraft support equipment/services with the airport contractor providing services to commercial aircraft. The BPAs included use of miscellaneous ground equipment, (tow trucks, power units, etc.,) with and without operators. One early morning during deicing operations, an incorrect mixture was sprayed on one aircraft resulting in a KC-

10 popcicle and an aborted mission. This raised some eyebrows, but the cause was attributed to the language barrier between the civilian operator and the on scene ground crew.

27. Trying to get some Motorola radios that were confiscated by the Saudis by using an interpreter in order to communicate with the officials. It took my entire TDY to retrieve them.

28. I was stationed at X Air Base. The biggest problem that I had was during Ramadan. There were only two Contracting Officers at this base, another SSgt and myself. The BCO was a MSgt and did not work on the normal every day stuff. During Ramadan, I was expected to purchase all local items during the night and provide customer support during the day. This meant that I worked all the time. A normal duty day for me during that month and a half was 18 - 20 hours, and I had work as many as 36 hours straight. Now, I know that this sound unreal, but it did happen. I did not receive any support from the MSgt. In fact, after working one of the 36 hour shifts the MSgt woke me up after only 6-8 hours of sleep and told me to go back to work. This is only one story of many.

29. As one of the first CCO to arrive, one of my most unique challenges was to learn the Riyadh area. Since most of my business was conducted on a face-to-face basis (for the most part I stayed away from the O&M contractors),

learning the area was crucial. Learning the area was unique; getting lost and trying to find your way back was interesting. Most of the contractors spoke English. However, it seemed whenever I got lost, no one spoke English. My most interesting war story was meeting with a Saudi woman owned contractor. There's no secret that women in Saudi are second class citizens. Meeting Dr. Almana was something I'll never forget. I had to go to her place because she wasn't permitted on the Government compound. The thing which intrigued me was a skull and cross bones which was in front of an apartment building which also was her office. Taking a deep breath, I worked up enough courage to walk in. I was immediately greeted by a woman (without the robe and veil). She looked really mad and blocked the entrance way. I mentioned the Doctor's name and she motioned for me to stay where I was. I met with the Doctor and her partner. Ironically, both were educated in the United States (Michigan State and Univ. of Miami). Both explained the commodities and services they provided. At the conclusion of our meeting, I inquired about the skull and crossbones. Dr. Almana said it was a warning for men to stay out. (I'm probably one of a handful of American men to speak with a Saudi woman). As I said an interesting war story.

30. Trailer drivers had a physical confrontation in the bomb dump over who was to load first (they were hungry and it was late in the afternoon during Ramadan). Transportation NCO and myself calmed them down until SPs could arrive and control the situation.

31. CCOs were forced to work all hours due to the varying hours kept by merchants in the AOR, which was mainly due to religious observances.

GETTING STARTED

32. The first challenge to overcome was how to deal with the short notice. I had less than 10 hour days to prepare myself and my family for my absence. I understand the Air Force is notorious for its short notices but when our office has knowledge of the tasking one month prior, they should do everything possible to select an individual as quickly as possible. This may be an office-unique problem and not the norm throughout the Air Force but I've heard the war stories about others as well.

33. The most unique contracting challenge was when we first arrived in the Middle East and we had to build the site from the ground up. It was extremely difficult because the contractors spoke little to no English, COs were dispersing agents, restricted to base, everyone expected all supplies/services to be bought yesterday and American currency was not accepted.

34. The single biggest problem was finding an effective place to work. The commander did not want us working in an office off-base because of security, but with three gates to pass through to get to the contracting office, being

stopped and inspected at each gate, and contractors not being allowed to enter at all, all together created a hardship. I finally managed to get the theater

HCA to authorize a cellular phone and I spent most of my day working out of my vehicle, visiting contractors at their offices or finding neutral ground at a hotel lobby.

HOST NATION SUPPORT

35. Dealing with a host nation to arrange a support agreement and subsequent items and services proved to be a challenge. I established a team of logistic and contracting experts to negotiate the agreement and to work the daily requests for host nation support. This required us to continuously be on top of our requirements to the host nation to ensure that they had the same sense of urgency as U.S. personnel did.

36. Coordinating and understanding host nation agreements. Understanding these agreements saved the U.S. government a "bunch" of money. Due to the fact (Oman) we did not have to write a contract of base refuse, electrical support, billeting, and gasoline.

37. Dealing with the RSAF Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) assistance in kind contracts. When I arrived in Dec 91, MODA had refused to pay approximately \$1.6 million for vehicle support at Dhahran. Previous

CCO had worked diligently but was unable to convince MODA of need to pay. Working with CENTAF (Forward) at Riyadh and 4404 CW(P)/LGT, we were able to trace vehicle rentals from Desert Shield through our deployment in the cease-fire campaign. When we provided MODA with records all the way back to Aug 91, MODA agreed to pay. They did, request a "down scope" in the number of vehicles thereafter (reduced price).

TERMINATIONS/CLAIMS

38. The hardest part was Termination for Convenience on rental vehicles. Many contractors purchased new vehicles for rental, and were not happy when we cited the Termination clause; however, no claims from the site were received, all vehicle rental terminations were negotiated at a cost settlement of not more than five percent of the remaining contract cost.

39. I didn't have any unique purchasing experiences; however, I did encounter a problem dealing with a claim for a stolen or lost rental vehicle. One of our redeployed bases had one of their vehicles stolen the day before they left and the CCO didn't think that it was necessary to let the only other military unit in the area know. I believe I could have handled this problem more effectively if better lines of communication were open between deployed forces in the same location.

40. One final problem that became a real headache was handling personnel claims for lost or damaged laundry against the laundry contract we wrote. It was constant every day.

COMPROMISING POSITIONS

41. I was stationed in Taif, SA and the Saudi liaison Col. X told me we had to have our officers leave the Al Gaim complex where they lived; because I wouldn't enter into an agreement which would obligate the government into a contract over \$1,000,00.00. We had plans to build our site up to include a dining hall, swimming pool, basketball courts, a running track, paved roads, and ten more double wide trailers. I had someone fly in from Riyadh from civil engineering to draw up the plans, but no money had been obligated. He wanted us to go to his sources, I told him it didn't work that way and he said he wouldn't let anyone else on the base. We'd been putting him off trying to get funds together to make this happen, he always threaten us with eviction he and the base commander both got payoffs from the contractors and by this time the base commander had got fed up and gave us a deadline to leave. The base commander happened to be a prince so there was not too much we could do. I called my point of contact in Riyadh, Capt X, and explained the situation to him and he and another gentlemen flew down to lend me some assistance. We ended up putting our officers in a five star hotel because there was no other hotel in the vicinity of the base.

42. There were several. Dealing with bribes and kickbacks proved difficult. It was rampant and the temptations were very strong. Much training is needed on dealing effectively when placed in a potentially compromising situation.

43. Collusion between the local contractors and vendors seemed rampant. This became clear when we had an asphalt job for a trailer pad. We made an award to the low bidder who also had the base maintenance contract (Dhahran). Several more asphalt jobs were coming up for bid and this guy had the advantage over the other bidders. When we started to see performance problems with our current contractor, he was unable get the material, rental equipment was hard to come by and the all important base passes for his workers all of a sudden became a problem. As a result, the current contractor failed on his contract, he was given a poor performance rating by CE and his once good name was now dirt. We discovered later the local contractors had the feeling this contractor was getting to big and receiving an unfair portion of the contracts. They in turn colluded and successfully cut his legs at the knees. He was no longer the low bidder on future bids even through we still allowed him to bid. One other factor came into play, that was the role the Saudi officials played. They deliberately delayed the contractor by not approving base passes for his workers, without the workers he was unable to perform on time. The OSI informed us the base

security officer was at the root of this problem and had used his position to put the contractor of his choice in the best position to get the contracts. The implication was he getting kickbacks.

MONEY MATTERS

44. Bedding down a unit without cash for payment was accomplished by using BPAs until funds officer could arrive.

45. Upon arriving at my location, I was unable to provide support for my wing because I was deployed with no funds or funding instrument. There was no finance support at my location. The previous wing withdrew and took their CCO with them. He had been given Treasury checks and was acting as CCO and as a paying agent using cash to pay for all transactions. I finally received a funding document from home station but still had no finance support. My home station finance wanted me to submit all invoices to them for payment, a process which would take up to 90 days for receipt of payment if we were lucky and the mail got to us. As it was, I decided to speak to the Army Comptroller and request support through ARCENT. After making arrangements with the Army finance personnel, I needed to set up a system where I could get checks issued on a weekly basis rather than monthly, as was customary. My vendors were very slow to accept me since I was unable to pay with cash as the previous CCO had. Once I set up procedures

with ARCENT about weekly payments, the vendor response improved although some still refused to accept payment by check.

MISCELLANEOUS

46. Acted as a filter between wing requirements and an unresponsive Naval Support Facility contracting office that administers a Base Operating Support contract.

47. Set up operational wing for Restore Hope out of Taif. Even though there was already one small contingent of US troops operating from this location, they were part of a different operation. The pots of money were different. There were many political issues both internally within the two Air Force units and externally between US forces and the Saudi Air Force. Lines of command were not clear. Took a lot of diplomacy, on our part, and support from upper level staff to get all of the players to cooperate. At times, it didn't seem like we were all on the same team due to the difference in mission. Having a separate finance and contracting officer for each unit made all the difference.

48. Getting people to run their shops the way they do at home. Everybody wanted to throw out the normal checks and balances. For example, when equipment such as copiers, water coolers, and miscellaneous office equipment

was rented, no one wanted to establish accountability. Base Supply, who was supposed to set up CACRL listings, took a long time to do so and, as a result, the CCO was not on top of all the equipment he/she had rented. Then some of the stuff got sent home and we had to negotiate payments for materials we could not find. Since I was at X, locating supplies and services was no problem. There were more problems with the people who didn't want to do the paperwork right or at all.

- CONTRACTOR FAILURE TO PERFORM -

131. Did any of your contractors refuse to work as a direct result of hostilities breaking out? If so, how did you deal with the situation?

REFUSED TO WORK

1. Contractors failed to perform when scud attacks started. After contractor employees were issued gas masks they returned to work.
2. Foreign Owned and Operated Manufacturers and suppliers: Sources refused to do business so we had to use an alternate source (Broker) to purchase the exact materials (chemicals) without uncovering the exact end destination. (Desalination Plants) OPSFC. Varied quantities & sources.
3. Yes. Asked the contractor to work longer hours and prioritized our requirements.
4. Yes, a lot of the principle contractors (the owners) left the country. That in itself presented problems. Some quit -- most stayed. the Saudis did not understand the competitive bidding process at first! They quickly learned.

NO REFUSAL TO WORK

5. No

6. Negative. I had the best support from contractors I'd ever seen.

7. None of our contractors refused to work as a result of the hostilities!

8. Only in that some wanted cash payment right away rather than waiting for a check. Other than that, they were great.

9. No, but after the hostilities ceased a lot of contractors were afraid we would leave without paying our bills. Especially the BPAs the Saudi's were paying. We had to constantly reassure them that final payments would be made before we left.

10. NO!!

11. No.

12. No.

13. None.

14. No.

15. One did - but not as a result of hostilities, but from an inability to perform so many food service contracts. The company was simply saturated and was unable to obtain the food stuffs and personnel to perform the service. I T4Cd the contract and pressed-on. The company helped me obtain another firm who did successfully perform the contract.

16. No, all contractors work diligently and were very cooperative.

17. NO, However when the hostilities broke out we did terminate the contracted out dining facility, so that there was no chance of any local nationals poisoning the food.

18. NO.

19. no.

20. No.

21. Fortunately in the UAE everyone felt rather safe. Some Europeans left at Christmas, but returned soon after the war started. It was never a problem. It think some contractors felt it was a better vantage point to watch the planes take off and land.

22. Was very rare. There was always a contractor to turn to. By the time the hostilities broke out we had bought at least 12 of everything manufactured in the world, so we really didn't need anything else, but incidentals.

23. Not a player.

24. No, they were very generous and very cooperative in every manner.

25. No.

26. Contractors were willing and ready to sell anything we wanted.

27. Not in the UAE.

28. The aircraft servicing contractor employees threatened to strike in protest of the war, however, no strike ensued.

29. No.

30. During SCUD missile attacks we went to MREs for lunch, instead of contract services. This lasted the entire time of Desert Storm. A lot of the local Saudi merchants left the country and had the third country nationals do all the contracting.

31. No problems.

32. No. I was there after the war.

33. NO.

34. NO.

35. Since we were not as close to the front lines as other organizations (Al Kharj, KSA), we experienced very little problem with the contractors willingness to perform. Only the contracts written by the Saudi government for our location had problems.

36. No.

37. No. Never deployed in an area where hostilities surfaced.

38. No. Most of them understood Saddam's version of Arab nationalism and decided that they liked U.S. dollars better.

39. No. It cost more for delivery than before hostilities broke out which the government paid in order to receive supplies day or night.

40. There was some initial nervousness when hostilities first broke out. However, luckily no contractors walked out on us.

NOT APPLICABLE

42. Don't know, deployed after hostilities. However, some CCOS made verbal promises to vendors that they would be paid for services or supplies rendered under verbal contract. Subsequently, personnel deployed later had to attend to demands for payment's that subsequent commander refused to fund.

- EFFECTIVENESS OF SIMULATIONS -

132. If you participated in base exercises or deployments before Desert Shield, describe your feelings regarding the statement, "We trained like we fought."

DID NOT "TRAIN LIKE WE FOUGHT"

1. In my experience, we have never trained like we fought
2. I don't think training under base exercises can come close to the real thing.
3. "NOT!" The way I went to war and the way we practiced were different except I went on a plane and carried a contingency contracting kit. Of course my situation was a bit unique since I ended up in Diego Garcia.
4. During base exercises, we pretend to train like we fight. However, because we know that its an exercise, we tend to just do enough to get by. Because of the lessons experienced during the Gulf War, future exercises will focus on "training like we will fight" the next war.
5. Wrong! I think wing commanders have either forgotten or weren't there to realize how important the contracting function is to his or her abilities to

survive , literally, and I think that's sad. Hopefully, if we go to war again, there will be contracting personnel around to get us on that first plane.

6. During exercises we were able to determine requirements and contract prior to the deployment. During base exercises the exercise participants do not know the role contracting plays. Therefore, contracting doesn't get much involvement.

7. Statement was non existent.

8. To me, base exercises are a waste of time for experienced CCO's. Sure, it is a method of training but, most of the time a CCO spends on a base exercise is spent in a holding area. No real scenarios are used for CCO's during base exercises. Deployments are the best experience for CCO's. This allows them to take the knowledge they have learned from on-the-job training and formal classes and actually go out and use this knowledge.

9. No training prior to my deployment was received.

10. Operations must have coined this phrase. By the time an exercise gets down to needing support from contracting they are ready to go home and just say "OK RESUPPLY" was accomplished. They don't want to wait for a realistic time frame to occur before the supplies or services can be put in place.

Many times the finance office doesn't play and then how realistic is the exercise? I firmly believe if you have a solid OJT program and teach people how to handle PO's/Imprest Funds/BPAs/write SOW's for basic services you can get the job done when you go into deployments or real world actions.

11. Participation in base exercises was limited primarily to processing in mobility lines, bag drags, vehicle convoys, etc. Having attended various site surveys for actual deploying units from the states proved to be the best "training" in preparation for this deployment.

12. We trained for mobility only and when we deployed we didn't even use the mobility line. You went to legal, medical, base supply mo-bags, etc. on your own. None of the base exercises reflected on how to be a CCO.

13. I don't feel that any training that I have had with bases exercises came even remotely close to preparing me for Desert Shield.

14. Base exercises and deployments were nothing like the "real thing". From what I remember of exercises they never tested you. Often times they put you in a corner and forgot about you. Deployments were another matter. During deployments the "normal" things were purchased. No real challenge. Since the real thing happens so seldom, I'm not sure how beneficial it would be to have training. One suggestion I would recommend is when the ground rules

come down for an exercise, incorporate wartime contingencies. New CCO would under the \$100,000 small purchase threshold and SF 44 for \$25,000.

15. We never participated as Contracting Officers in base exercises, so there was not any training in our career field, we were augmentees for briefing loadmasters and troop commanders. Langley was primarily concerned with getting the folks to the deployment site, but we never exercised on actually being at the site.

16. No.

17. We did not train like we fought. But we improvised and survived. Contracting personnel are very resourceful. You cannot train for everything in life, you have to use your common sense and ingenuity. Training does help though, especially hands-on training and exercises.

18. No way! During exercises contracting is usually on the last plane out, and nobody seems to know why we are there. In the real thing you can't just simulate that you have everything you need to accomplish the mission. Real requirements come up. All of the sudden contracting becomes the answer to many questions. Everything that wasn't planned for or forgotten must be procured usually very quickly. As long as there is money available you can buy almost anything the commanders need to accomplish the mission.

19. We did not have that type of training.

20. You have to be kidding. Most of the base exercises were one big cluster!!!!
Real world scenarios? Senior commanders and exercise controllers need to
get a clue real quick. If we had fought in the Gulf the way that "we" exercised,
there would have either been a lot of dead grunts or POWs!!!!

21. Not true! Saudi was a whole new dimension in the aspects of
government contracting. I do feel that Hurlburt Field had a better program
than the arriving units. We were better prepared, but, we learned that
improvements could be made. Hurlburt has had specialized "contingency
contracting" flight for years.

22. I never participated in an actual deployment prior to ODS/DS, however, I
did participate in many exercises in previous assignments at Nellis, Upper
Heyford, and Torrejon. But the only thing I ever did was act as an augmentee
for an to other specialties (i.e. cargo courier, the mobility processing line, etc.).
I appeared to me that no one ever thought that contracting would ever be
needed (or else we would've participated in the exercises as a contracting
specialist). In fact, believe it or not, when I was deployed to ODS/DS I went
on the advance team, but my commander had to "convince" the wing
commander to take me along. It seems they hadn't even considered taking a

contracting person even though they had no idea what type of facilities of sources would be available in country when they arrived.

23. The statement is not totally accurate. Because of necessity, we had to perform at a level much higher than we were trained to. CWT and weapon training should be more intense and frequent.

24. Strongly disagree... or Desert Storm was too easy.

MIXED EMOTIONS

25. Deployments participated in before Desert Shield were a couple of airplane crashes in the UK. The resulting experience paid dividends during Desert Shield.

26. Sometimes. We occasionally deployed to a bare base. Usually your CCOs deployed to CONUS locations and provided support on a limited basis (usually a host contracting office nearby). However, I deployed with X AFB for Joint Exercise FUERZAS UNIDAS 91 to Paraguay and had a chance to train as we would fight. EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY AND PRACTICE. I supported two locations--one required C-130 airlift to get to. Airlift Control Element (ALCE) or Tactical Airlift Control Element (TALCE) exercises provide the best deployment training.

27. With each scenario being different it's hard to say that all training situations would be helpful. The biggest problem I face is that Contracting is "simulated". The most exercise we get is dragging the bags around. Up until recently, CONS hasn't been included in the FOL and hasn't set-up a FOL office per se. The exercise of setting-up and FOL office and actually obtaining supplies and services goes a long way toward effective training. I learned the hard way. Luckily, the MIGHTY FORCE 88 exercises I participated in provided realistic training. Otherwise, DESERT SHIELD would have been a shocker!

28. At X AFB I would say it would be true. As I left X and new faces arrived in key positions, high ranking, the old attitude of we train like we fight was fading. Someone once said history should never be forgotten, I believe in some cases it is.

29. A contingency is different than any other type of contracting and in many ways easier. I have been through a hurricane, a flash flood, seven aircraft accidents and a war. I really don't know how you could train someone for areal life contingency, except in a classroom. Exercise scenarios can't really be that realistic without involving the public. Simulation in a contracting scenario isn't helpful. What I would like to see in a classroom environment is how our rules change. Remember, the majority of CCOs are stateside. So

DOL, SBA, synopsis preparations, and IFB formats go away. Our CCOs need to know what are the rules in a contingency, how to innovate, and that they a vital part of the operation. It just can't, in many ways be done without them. To answer your question we learn contracting in our everyday jobs and in a contingency we cut the red tape and do pure contracting. I for one, don't want to see us playing games like the rest of the base.

TRAINED LIKE WE FOUGHT

30. Participated in Bright Star 90, and I believe we trained like we fought. A contracting office was established in a downtown hotel (where all contracting and finance personnel resided and worked). This was basically the same type of setup used during the Gulf War at my location--except host nation office buildings were used with residential compounds.

- YOUR IDEAS ON TRAINING SCENARIOS -

133. Describe a scenario you feel would be useful for training CCOs during a base exercise or deployment.

FOCUS ON INITIAL DEPLOYMENT ISSUES

1. Given the infinite possibilities, the scenario which would best prepare a CCO would be actual participation or deployment to receive and bed down incoming units. He/she would have to be one of the first on the scene and have a working knowledge of the units contract support requirements. Short of an actual deployment, active participation in exercise site surveys is great training.

2. Most importantly is the first 30 days - finding vendors, getting transportation and water, and establishing good procedures with base supply immediately. So, a good scenario - you just arrived; need water and transportation immediately; base supply has not set up yet, nor has base transportation and you haven't had time to even think about making BPAs. You've also got approximately 30 pages of requirements coming at you every day beginning on day 2. This really happened. Base supply didn't set up for almost 50 days. We were contracting and base supply and pick-up and delivery.

3. Base exercises should have scenarios to duplicate wartime. We in contracting should have the opportunity to practice dealing with problems that arise with any deployment, especially on what to do when you first arrive at the site and the stress put on the Contracting Officers to get the immediate necessities.

4. You have landed at base x, with 100 deployed personal, yourself and a finance person have been told by the commander that they will need food and shelter for the 100 personal. The town has just a few hotels/motels, 2 grocery stores and 3 or 4 restaurants. You also have the equipment for cooking meals. The base commander also states that he and a few members of his staff will need transportation for a few days until the supplies arrive, also you do not speak the language of the area. (Have fun) P.S. This really did happen....

5. Something where the CCO had to provide for a bare base environment would be useful. Often times the deployments at this base the only thing the CCO did was rent cars and hotel rooms then become the transportation and billeting officer for the rest of the exercise. The CCO needs to practice being tasked and performing to provide for setting up a base in the middle of nowhere.

6. Bare base or deploying with an ALCE/TALCE on a real world exercise. The CCO does it all from transportation to troop bed down.

7. Bare base, no electricity, water or quarters for 5000 personnel who will be arriving in 30 days or less with a language barrier in the AOR.

8. Deploy a CCO with an AFGIG and \$100,000 in U.S. currency in an austere environment. Couple it with major logistics type problems and make the CCO perform! Buy essentials; water, food, trans, airfield services, utilities, etc.

9. That's easy. 200 tired, hungry an homeless airman arrive at an unknown location with no prepositioned means of support. The CCO must go out (w/a paying agent) and secure food, transportation, and billeting in sufficient quantities until Air Force assets arrive 48 hours later.

SIMULATE A FORWARD OPERATING LOCATION

10. Deploy to another location, set up an operational office, prepare mock contracts for food service, transportation, etc. Close-out/terminate contracts and re-deploy.

11. Give more of a real world impression on the subject. For instance instead of reminding people that this is only an exercise they should just operate as

the real thing. Take the team to a location away from the home base and have the personnel operate like the real thing, if possible.

12. Get off the installation and play the game for real!!!! Give us real world situations to handle. Only don't let some of these contracting types carry guns -- they're scary!!!!

13. Assemble team of CCOs, brief them that they'll be setting up an FOL Contingency Contracting Office. Place senior team member in charge. Lay ground rules but arrange for a bare room in some remote building. Tell them to set up shop. Plant seeds with other organizations for them to send in urgent requirements. Have the teams get communications, vehicle, office equipment/furniture, etc. Have SNCO act as CCO EET and play a ghost role to observe and to help them in a bind. While in the FOL they play all the games, i.e. evacuation and chem warfare. Make the teams rotate in shifts, each shift overlapping and briefing each other. I could go on and on, I think this type of training has great potential! About a week or so before the exercise, give a 3-hour CCO training review. Only problem is this takes a lot of time. Its nearly impossible to do if your CCOs are included in the mobility portion of the exercise. We did this once when we weren't playing in the mobility portion. Be sure to coordinate these activities with LG and CVX. I think this should happen at least semi-annually and attention should be paid to even the smallest details like setting up a filing system, finding out who

your customers are, where their 24hr points of contacts are, researching requirements, and yes, even finding the deployment commander and briefing him on your role, your office and what your mission is.

14. Don't confine the training to a mobility processing line. Set-up and FOL office. Make actual purchases. And pair and experienced person (now that we finally have some) with someone who's clueless. The only way to learn is by doing it. We're the only AFSC that places more emphasis on our peacetime mission than our wartime taskings. We need to reverse this trend. Formal education using realistic scenarios are the key!

PROMOTE CROSS-FUNCTIONAL INTERACTION

15. Have contingencies or events happen that have not been planned for. Have an air plane carrying most or all of the tools for a maintenance unit be lost. Now you have a bunch of airplanes and troops that can't function because they don't have tools. What do you do? You have to get them right away. So you buy them. Makes the organization look at what do they really need to function. Puts all the players in the game. Mechanics, Commanders, Finance, CE, Contracting are all involved and forced to work together just as we have to in a contingency type ops.

16. PERSCO support training for small forward locations. Air Cargo Terminal Operations for utilization of pipelines controlled by the Theater Commander. Cash payments/Foreign currency and monthly (periodical) reporting. DCATS.

17. Have a finance rep with some monopoly money in the same location with the CCO when the PR is submitted

18. Train CCOs on consolidating and coordinating requirements with major customers (i.e. CE) in writing PWS. Working with AF Form 616s. Paying agent duties. Most importantly, what's authorized to be purchased with appropriated funds.

19. I think we should work closely with base supply and finance to see how they operate on a contingency level. We improvise based on the situation at the moment, are they as flexible? During war it's not a problem, but during a deployment we may conflict.

DO ACTUAL WORK

20. Go out to the local market buy an item using a SF44, take along a finance officer, pay cash, fill out the 44, return the item to the base, check it in with supply, and take it to the organization needing the actual item. Do not

simulate this, go through the actual steps. Also, practice setting up a BPAS, putting on gas mask and chem suit, use of the military phone (the green one, we called it the bat phone), more practice with small arms training to protect resources, I don't need to carry around an M-16, which I had training on. I need a 9mm, and training on small arms.

21. Simple taskings; purchase of water, rental of vehicles, conversion of money service contracts for hauling wastes and transportation, writing BPAs, funds security, completion of SF44s.

22. Once every three months or so, take a few CE requirements and have the CCOs use their kit and take care of the requirements.

23. Anything to do with construction equipment, loss of communications or the need for transportation would work. A near crisis I ran into was almost running out of item X. I had to have it shipped from Japan. Aviator's Breathing Oxygen would become a crisis. The scenarios can't be too long or you won't be able to realistically carry it out.

24. An actual project to accomplish. Everything is just simulated without it.

MISCELLANEOUS

25. Any scenario would be better than none. Like I said, I had no idea of what to expect, I had never been out before and had never participated in any exercises. We have base exercises regularly but Contracting has little involvement, if any. We, from what I'm told, do nothing more than rent hotel rooms and vehicles. For the two years I've been here we have not participated in any deployment exercises.

26. Give a certain disaster or mock war scenario, have the Deployed Commander brief the CCO of what supplies, services, and construction will be required during this time and allow them to get quotations on what is needed.

27. I believe one must develop a scenario on dealing with the host nation; what to expect when preparing to negotiate and negotiating a host nation support agreement; and how to deal with the local contractors and government representatives once the agreement is signed.

28. Use a Desert Shield scenario. Something that requires covering all bases. (Billeting, Transportation, add a few unknown variables).

29. Actually deploying to overseas locations and tasked to operate with limited assistance from established U.S. overseas bases would be the best training exercise. Next best would be deploying away from your home base and contract using SF 44s and establishing BPAs for required supplies and services. The least desirable is home base exercises -- you are too familiar with your own location.

30. Go into a foreign country where American currency is not accepted and set up form a hotel or bare base to support a deployment.

31. I believe that the deployment exercises could be beneficial to CCOs; however, if a member of the Contracting Office is trained on deploying, they should be sent when emergencies occur. There were a few members of my office that did have the deployment training and management didn't elect to send them in support of Desert Storm. Just recently our base deployed people to a remote site in New Mexico for training, but no males were selected to receive this training and they are not sending any women to Desert Calm.

32. Sending them to an aircraft crash as I have done. It would allow them to use the SF44 and the imprest funds that are available. Also, it would put them in a field condition that they might be in while being deployed.

33. Send a CCO with deploying units often. Many of the same problems we encounter overseas can occur here as well. The CCO should also get involved with the unit and its mission. The CCO will be better able to anticipate problems before they happen. Stress after action reports and briefing of other members of the unit after your return. They need to learn from your mistakes and your successes.

34. Have fill-in the blank SOW's for some of the services and repair requirements that can be expected. Then when you setup your tent you will have something to train on while everyone else is doing their thing. For example, have 5 x 7 cards with something that your EET member can give your people to work on; 600 man force is due to arrive in 24 hours provide tents, toilet facilities, add additional cooks, etc. Many times the command center is not geared to give you scenario so your contracting eval team member can create these scenarios for your people while the rest of the operations group does their thing. People from OPS don't think about resupply in exercises.

35. The only real scenario is that of actual contingency.

- YOUR IDEAS -

134. List any further initiatives or ideas you feel would be beneficial for training contingency contracting officers in the future.

START A FORMAL CLASS

1. A formal school should be established. I know DCATS is out there, but guess what? - I've never used it. During an emergency is no time to read the owners manual.
2. A formal course would be better than "learn as you go."
3. Develop a CCO training course if possible.
4. I think formal training classes would be the most beneficial. In a formal training or workshop type atmosphere, all the class attendees can share their most unique experiences because no deployment is the same.
5. Have mandatory classes that are required for any active duty member who has a mobility number.

6. Formal classes. Have a class at Lowry or use a mobile class to training key people in contingency contracting. The Air Force also needs to train LGs about CCOs. In addition, it wouldn't hurt to educate wing commanders on contingency contracting. CCOs did a good job, but if we have been better trained, we could have saved more money.

7. Formal training & OJT would be a huge benefit for future deployments.

8. First of all, you've got to offer a formal class to get out people inundated in what being a CCO is all about. A week long class at Lowry or a "road show" would be adequate. Have experienced CCOs teach it, and offer it to any 651XX any commander is thinking about putting in a mobility position. Second, add a "contingency" block to the Basic Contracting Specialty course and to the 5 and 7 level CDCs. Get our airman familiar with the "idea" that day they enter the field. I think it will help in that they won't be as intimidated or ignorant of CCO responsibilities when their turn to deploy arrives.

9. There should definitely be a course for those who don't have base level experience before they go on contingencies. Basic understanding of base level type requirements will really help CCOs.

10. A formalized class would be very beneficial.

11. Use people who have been deployed during Desert Shield/Storm/Calm to write and teach any technical courses. Include 7-level NCOs that were out pounding the pavement. The same goes for base exercises. Issue more limited warrants at the base level to NCOs to gain some CO experience.

12. One initiative might be to develop training scenarios based on actual after action reports from various contingencies. If formal academic training is being considered, role playing in these scenarios would be the way to go. This would challenge potential CCOs to be flexible, react to different situations, and think on their feet. Successful completion should result in the award of a CCO warrior badge.

13. Set up at least one operational level formal school for CCOs.

14. Training should, if not already, be introduced at the school house. I've taken several contracting courses and cannot remember any of them focusing on CCO responsibilities. Actual on the job training is good but, in real time situation, having the pressures of the deployment upon you, is not the best time.

ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS

15. I feel that a special duty assignment should be established with a 4 year controlled tour at Headquarters, Air Force Special Operations Command, for the purpose of an elite contingency contracting team of world-wide deployments. they could establish pre-arranged agreements for world-wide situations! "Anytime, Anywhere," The 1st in! As you are aware, special operations is the wave of the future. They are generally the first people in! The contingency operations could be tailored for each section/country, with special CCO teams prepared for that particular sector. They would lead others in what the necessary kit make-ups. Small, 1/2 pallet, 2 pallet, etc...

16. The training of CCOs is a great idea, however what I fell would be more of a help in this situation is to deploy the CCOs to one area from the same office. This helps because you already know the people you are working and you know what to expect from that person. (There is nothing worse than feeling that you are out on a limb and no one cares).

17. CCOs should be from other bases, not the home base. Too much pressure in the rank structure. The LG and Wing CC sign your performance reports leading CCOs to do what his superiors want instead of what is right (or legal).

18. CCOs should be involved in all early planning for a deployment to know what they may be required to provide and offer input to obtaining support prior to deploying.

19. I feel strongly that contracting squadrons should be field operating units, reporting directly to MAJCOM/LGC instead of the Wing CC. This would solve the above problem

20. Assign CCOs to the deploying unit (ALCE/TALCE) on a rotational basis. These units are self contained (they have supply, transportation, aerial port, etc., troops assigned on a full time basis). CCOs only play when asked to. It's hard to pick up and go when the rest of your deployed unit has trained together all along.

21. One warning: The new UTCs have Officer/NCO teams. I think this is a good idea, but I hope young officers don't get the impression that their job is to act as go between wing leadership and the enlisted CCO. In a real world situation this will become extremely frustrating to your enlisted folks. I worked with a BCO for a short time during the war. He was really good and a fine officer but having that needless layer impeded the process in my opinion. Anyone who goes as part of a CCO team needs to be willing to roll up their sleeves and work, even if this means a Captain helping an A1C from Maintenance to fill out an AF form 9. On the flip side, having an officer

would help sometimes especially when dealing with the Navy who seem to have a real problem relating to enlisted. Again, though we don't need someone to give orders and sit in the daily briefing with the commander. I'm not convinced that its best to send a young officer with 6 or less years as a team leader with a SNCO who may have 15 years or better.

TRAIN COMMANDERS ON CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING

22. The ones that need the training are Wing commanders and LGs that think anything goes just because they are in a war environment. They tend to spoil themselves first and other officers and overload the CCOs with non-mission essential requirements. I do not know how you are going to fight that. ALSO, LGs need to approve each and every requirement; they are the ones that need training not us.

23. I found that more often than not commanders in general came to contracting when the original plan fell through and they were in a jam. Putting their requirements into SOWs and getting what ever goods or services they needed was difficult. Getting it was not the problem, but writing the SOW was. Often Commanders didn't really know what they needed and expected the CO to advise them. With time this was not a problem but at first it seemed quite overwhelming. Having been at base level contracting really helped.

24. AFR 70-7 states the CCOs should directly report to the Wing CC, but that was not done in the DESERT! The Wing Kings cared very little about the CCOs except when they needed something immediately, they were more concerned with "flying and fighting."

25. Prepare briefings or training for logistic group commander's explaining contracting's role. Most often, they are maintenance oriented and do not fully understand the nature of problems often faced by contracting personnel. We need their support to do our jobs successfully. Operational commander's lack respect for central forward officers. This position needs to be more clearly defined and this problem addressed because cco's appear to have multiple bosses in the field. (Causes confusion)

MONEY MATTERS

26. Stress the importance of assigning a paying agent to each CCO to eliminate potential problems of the CCO purchasing, paying for, and accepting procured commodities and services.

27. The CCO must ensure funding documents are completed and available prior to actual deployment. You cannot hit the ground running without

money. Never believe the line that money will be there when you arrive because often it is not.

28. Have someone on the finance staff prepare a briefing about funding and who is to do it. At X location the host group from X AFB didn't want to pay for anything a support unit such as X ECS from X AFB needed. Commander wanted them to have their own monies. My experiences from Desert Storm told me that the host unit usually is responsible for all tenants. Took Major X from X AFB 30 days to convince the provisional commander we were all one unit. By the way Col Busch did an outstanding job. I conducted the only contracting conference of Desert Storm for people outside Saudi and he really pulled things together for us.

29. Be more aware of kickbacks and not to get yourself caught up in it. I heard of a couple people getting in trouble because of this.

TOOLS OF THE TRADE

30. I'd like to see everyone go out with a notebook size PC. For that to work, I would like to see a tutorial to go with the DCATS program. The notebook should have a tiny printer (i.e. Ink Jet). Any equipment going with the CCO should require additional training. I also suggest that we think about including fax/modem capabilities with the notebook along with a hand

scanner. This would (along with SF 44s) provide an incredible capability for producing any required documents on the spot and forwarding any required documents anywhere they are needed.

31. Contracting has to be able to operate. We need space available to contractors and a cellular phone and fax right away. Security procedures with host base to allow contracting officers to pass gates quickly was an issue I worked over and over with no avail.

MISCELLANEOUS

32. It's about time!! Wish you guys the best!!! This is something that has been needed to help with future deployments!! Here in USAFE these type operations are ongoing and we continue to make the same mistakes over and over!!

33. Establish structured scenarios to be used by LGX people to be incorporated into planned for exercises.

34. I think your staff really hit the nail on the head when you addressed things like tracking shipments, teaching COs the whole picture, understanding the O plans. So often we don't understand the mission requirements of other units within the wing. Makes it difficult to support

them. We can buy all day but if it doesn't get to the customer on time we missed the boat.

35. Learn more about how to use the military transportation in the AOR as far as the forms, how to fill them out, the different colored tags for different priority shipments within the AOR.

36. I believe an interpreter would have been a big help and also more contact with the embassy (if possible). I also believe the finance person should be armed or have some kind of escort. We didn't due to a mix up, on the SP rotation the SPs leaving took their 9mm back with them and the SP's replacing them only had the M-16s which were not permitted downtown. We had no trouble but it just didn't feel safe.

37. The best experience is hands-on experience in my opinion. I spent almost 7 months over at the AOR and in my opinion that was contracting at its best and I highly recommend that CCOs go over there for 90 days and see what its all about.

38. Females can and should be given the opportunity to provide contracting support in Saudi Arabia. I saw many examples where women worked directly with the locals and in every case the locals did not treat them any differently than they would have a man. I saw women performing duties in

legal, public relations and security police. They performed their jobs without any hindrance by the locals. This holds true for other Arab countries such as Morocco, Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt. These people are businessmen and will do business with whoever holds the purse strings, including women.

39. It is easy to have someone else fly in and set you down. You have to close the door, leave a forwarding address and try to get out of there with as little as 48 hours notice. We should be just as available for natural disaster contingency contracting with the same level of expertise and application of common sense answers to what is seemingly a highly complex environment.

40. Each time a base deployment takes place the host base should pass through out the command or even the Air Force contracting community a lessons learned plan. Thank you for asking.

41. A meeting was conducted with other CCOs on my experiences. Basically, I explained the FAR is stretched. The rule of thumb is use common sense and document everything thoroughly. Another meeting is planned for the CCOs who returned from Restore Hope.

42. I think we learn most from actual situations. There is no course that could possibly teach me the things I learned in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The basic business practices are required and a dedication to mission

requirements. At our location we were not there to say what could not be done we were there to fight a war and by that we had a can do attitude!

ATTITUDE goes a long way!

43. My last comment concerns military (officers) contracting officers in general. In my current assignment I work with officers that have never been at base level contracting. They have never done a small purchase, and don't even know what a SF41 is! They come from what used to be Systems Command and have no idea what contingency contracting is about. So with no experience, they are not tapped for the on-going TDYs to Saudi Arabia. The poor suckers, like me, are targeted first to volunteer because of our experience. There is no need for military contracting officers in major weapons systems acquisition, a prime area to reduce the military manning in the contracting career field. I am at a disadvantage in my present job because I have very limited, high dollar contracting experience -- making advancement in the organization very difficult. Fortunately I can retire in two years, taking my experience elsewhere!

44. I feel that each contracting office should have exercises with evaluators. I have found that when we are sent on an exercise that no one knows are business but us.

45. Someone needs to realize that some of our senior airmen and airmen first class' have a hell of a lot more experience than some of these retread or R.O.A.D sergeants that were sent to the AOR. Start giving these folks opportunities. If we don't use them, then someone sure as hell will. You don't need 5 or 6 contracting officer in one office.

46. Just have people who have gone TDY to debrief all personnel upon their return on difficulties and just ordinary problems encountered and how they overcame them. This will give other people who have be in similar situations a course of action to take which would give a person a better feeling that just winging it and hoping it works.

Appendix E: Interviews

Personal Interview - 18 March 1993

SMSgt (CMSgt Select) Mike Davis
Superintendent of Policies and Procedures
Headquarters Air Combat Command
Langley AFB, VA 23665
DSN 574-5372

TRAINING

- Command-wide CCO training for 5 & 7 level NCOs and officers
- Train senior management on contracting capabilities
 - LGC squadron commanders brief logistics and wing commanders
 - Air War College
 - Air Command and Staff College
 - Commander's courses
 - Customer education during exercises

EQUIPPING

- Get the right tools (standardize across the Air Force)
 - Laptop PCs
 - Portable fax machines
 - Portable copy machines
 - Cellular phones
 - Prototyping a complete kit

STRUCTURING

- New Unit Tasking Codes (UTCs) for contracting
 - Independent
 - Flexible
- Reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)
 - Will use as advance team to bed down units
 - Experts in specific areas
 - Will train active duty units
- New Design of Capability (DOC) statement for contracting squadrons
 - If approved, will make contracting squadrons part of Status of Resources and Training (SORT) reporting
 - SORT reporting will help get resources for needed tools

CREDIT CARDS

- Testing at three bases with decreased restrictions for wartime use.
 - \$200K per month limits
 - Cash advances
 - Ability to contract for telecommunications

FUTURE INITIATIVES

- Contingency pamphlet
- Crossfeed of ORI scenarios

- Logistics group commander briefing
- Additional changes to AFR 70-7
- Matrix of plans against new UTCs
- Standardized contingency contract format
- Determine how best to use guard personnel
- Create a Checkered Flag annex for contracting

Telephone Interview - 2 July 1993

CMSgt John M. Elliot
Command Superintendent
Headquarters Air Mobility Command
Scott AFB, IL 62225
DSN 576-8725

TRAINING

- Meeting AFR 70-7 requirements

STRUCTURING

- Using Reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) to work contract airlift issues during wartime

FUTURE INITIATIVES

- Looking at Air Combat Command's initiatives for possible use

Telephone Interview - 6 July 1993

MSgt Robert C. Gorley
Instructor Supervisor
3400 TCHTS/TTMXIP
325 Yosemite
Lowry AFB, CO 80230
DSN 926-2648

CURRENT CCO TRAINING IN AETC ENLISTED COURSES

- No CCO unique training

FUTURE INITIATIVES

- Broad coverage of contingency contracting will be incorporated into 3, 5, and 7 level courses
 - Expected completion after move to Lackland AFB in 1994
 - Approximately 2 - 3 hours of coverage

Telephone Interview - 7 July 1993

Capt Marty Bobeck
Instructor
3400 TCHTS/TTMXP
325 Yosemite
Lowry AFB, CO 80230
DSN 926-4883

CURRENT CCO TRAINING IN AETC BASE LEVEL OFFICER COURSE

- No CCO unique training

FUTURE INITIATIVES

- Developing a Defense Acquisition University that will include AFLMC

Wartime Contingency Contracting Handbook as required reading

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Vitae

Captain Thomas J. Snyder was born on 23 July 1965 in Washington D.C. He graduated from George C. Marshall High School in Falls Church, Virginia in 1983. He immediately entered undergraduate studies at the University of Virginia and graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree in History in 1987. He was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the United States Air Force through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and reported for duty in February 1988. His first assignment was to the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Bergstrom AFB Texas as the assistant Base Contracting Officer. During his tour he served as chief of the commodities contracting branch, chief of the construction contracting branch, and served seven months overseas as the chief of the contracting division for the 388th Tactical Fighter Wing (provisional) during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. He received Tactical Air Command's Outstanding Contracting Officer award for fiscal year 1991. Upon reassignment from Bergstrom AFB in May 1992, he entered the school of Logistics and Acquisition Management, Air Force Institute of Technology. He is married to the former Boutia Pourhashemi of Falls Church, Virginia.

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Captain Jon B. Tigges was born on 9 April 1964 in Couer d' Alene, Idaho. He graduated from Silverton Union High School in Silverton, Oregon in 1982. In 1986 he graduated *cum laude* from Pacific Lutheran University in Tacoma, Washington with a bachelors degree in business administration. At the same time, he was honored as a distinguished graduate of Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and received a regular commission as a Second Lieutenant in the United States Air Force. In October 1986, he reported to Keesler AFB, Mississippi to serve as a Contract Management Officer in the Base Contracting Office. In December 1988, he transferred to Loring AFB, Maine where he served as the Executive Assistant for the Deputy Commander of Resource Management, the Deputy Chief of Operational Contracting , and finally, the Chief of Operational Contracting. After completing Squadron Officer School as a distinguished graduate in May 1992, he entered the school of Logistics and Acquisition Management, Air Force Institute of Technology. As of the printing of this document, he is currently assigned to the Edwards AFB Contracting Directorate. He is married to the former Chris Urda of Sacramento, California and has two sons, Brandon and Joshua.

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